Date:	Wed, 28 Jan 2015 09:16:05 -0500
From:	Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@...hat.com>
To:	Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
CC:	Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>,
	Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevich@...il.com>,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org, virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
	edumazet@...gle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] ipv6: Select fragment id during UFO/GSO segmentation
 if not set.

On 01/28/2015 05:34 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> On Mi, 2015-01-28 at 11:46 +0200, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
>> On Wed, Jan 28, 2015 at 09:25:08AM +0100, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
>>> Hello,
>>>
>>> On Di, 2015-01-27 at 18:08 +0200, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
>>>> On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 05:02:31PM +0100, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
>>>>> On Di, 2015-01-27 at 09:26 -0500, Vlad Yasevich wrote:
>>>>>> On 01/27/2015 08:47 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
>>>>>>> On Di, 2015-01-27 at 10:42 +0200, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
>>>>>>>> On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 02:47:54AM +0000, Ben Hutchings wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On Mon, 2015-01-26 at 09:37 -0500, Vladislav Yasevich wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> If the IPv6 fragment id has not been set and we perform
>>>>>>>>>> fragmentation due to UFO, select a new fragment id.
>>>>>>>>>> When we store the fragment id into skb_shinfo, set the bit
>>>>>>>>>> in the skb so we can re-use the selected id.
>>>>>>>>>> This preserves the behavior of UFO packets generated on the
>>>>>>>>>> host and solves the issue of id generation for packet sockets
>>>>>>>>>> and tap/macvtap devices.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This patch moves ipv6_select_ident() back in to the header file.  
>>>>>>>>>> It also provides the helper function that sets skb_shinfo() frag
>>>>>>>>>> id and sets the bit.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It also makes sure that we select the fragment id when doing
>>>>>>>>>> just gso validation, since it's possible for the packet to
>>>>>>>>>> come from an untrusted source (VM) and be forwarded through
>>>>>>>>>> a UFO enabled device which will expect the fragment id.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> CC: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
>>>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@...hat.com>
>>>>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>>>>>  include/linux/skbuff.h |  3 ++-
>>>>>>>>>>  include/net/ipv6.h     |  2 ++
>>>>>>>>>>  net/ipv6/ip6_output.c  |  4 ++--
>>>>>>>>>>  net/ipv6/output_core.c |  9 ++++++++-
>>>>>>>>>>  net/ipv6/udp_offload.c | 10 +++++++++-
>>>>>>>>>>  5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h
>>>>>>>>>> index 85ab7d7..3ad5203 100644
>>>>>>>>>> --- a/include/linux/skbuff.h
>>>>>>>>>> +++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h
>>>>>>>>>> @@ -605,7 +605,8 @@ struct sk_buff {
>>>>>>>>>>  	__u8			ipvs_property:1;
>>>>>>>>>>  	__u8			inner_protocol_type:1;
>>>>>>>>>>  	__u8			remcsum_offload:1;
>>>>>>>>>> -	/* 3 or 5 bit hole */
>>>>>>>>>> +	__u8			ufo_fragid_set:1;
>>>>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Doesn't the flag belong in struct skb_shared_info, rather than struct
>>>>>>>>> sk_buff?  Otherwise this looks fine.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Ben.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hmm we seem to be out of tx flags.
>>>>>>>> Maybe ip6_frag_id == 0 should mean "not set".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Maybe that is the best idea. Definitely the ufo_fragid_set bit should
>>>>>>> move into the skb_shared_info area.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That's what I originally wanted to do, but had to move and grow txflags thus
>>>>>> skb_shinfo ended up growing.  I wanted to avoid that, so stole an skb flag.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I considered treating fragid == 0 as unset, but a 0 fragid is perfectly valid
>>>>>> from the protocol perspective and could actually be generated by the id generator
>>>>>> functions.  This may cause us to call the id generation multiple times.
>>>>>
>>>>> Are there plans in the long run to let virtio_net transmit auxiliary
>>>>> data to the other end so we can clean all of this this up one day?
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't like the whole situation: looking into the virtio_net headers
>>>>> just adding a field for ipv6 fragmentation ids to those small structs
>>>>> seems bloated, not doing it feels incorrect. :/
>>>>>
>>>>> Thoughts?
>>>>>
>>>>> Bye,
>>>>> Hannes
>>>>
>>>> I'm not sure - what will be achieved by generating the IDs guest side as
>>>> opposed to host side?  It's certainly harder to get hold of entropy
>>>> guest-side.
>>>
>>> It is not only about entropy but about uniqueness.  Also fragmentation
>>> ids should not be discoverable,
>>
>> I belive "predictable" is the language used by the IETF draft.
>>
>>> so there are several aspects:
>>>
>>> I see fragmentation id generation still as security critical:
>>> When Eric patched the frag id generator in 04ca6973f7c1a0d ("ip: make IP
>>> identifiers less predictable") I could patch my kernels and use the
>>> patch regardless of the machine being virtualized or not. It was not
>>> dependent on the hypervisor.
>>
>> And now it's even easier - just patch the hypervisor, and all VMs
>> automatically benefit.
> 
> Sometimes the hypervisor is not under my control. You would need to
> patch both kernels in your case - non gso frames would still get the
> fragmentation id generated in the host kernel.

Why would non-gso frames need a frag id?  We are talking only UDP IPv6
here, so there is no frag id generation if the packet does't need to
be fragmented.

> 
>>> I think that is the same reasoning why we
>>> don't support TOE.
>>> If we use one generator in the hypervisor in an openstack alike setting,
>>> the host deals with quite a lot of overlay networks. A lot of default
>>> configurations use the same addresses internally, so on the hypervisor
>>> the frag id generators would interfere by design.
>>> I could come up with an attack scenario for DNS servers (again :) ):
>>>
>>> You are sitting next to a DNS server on the same hypervisor and can send
>>> packets without source validation (because that is handled later on in
>>> case of openvswitch when the packet is put into the corresponding
>>> overlay network). You emit a gso packet with the same source and
>>> destination addresses as the DNS server would do and would get an
>>> fragmentation id which is linearly (+ time delta) incremented depending
>>> on the source and destination address. With such a leak you could start
>>> trying attack and spoof DNS responses (fragmentation attacks etc.).
>>> See also details on such kind of attacks in the description of commit
>>> 04ca6973f7c1a0d.
>>>
>>> AFAIK IETF tried with IPv6 to push fragmentation id generation to the
>>> end hosts, that's also the reason for the introduction of atomic
>>> fragments (which are now being rolled back ;) ).
>>>
>>> Still it is better to generate a frag id on the hypervisor than just
>>> sending a 0, so I am ok with this change, albeit not happy.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Hannes
>>>
>>
>> OK so to summarize, identifiers are only re-randomized once per jiffy,
>> so you worry that within this window, an external observer can discover
>> past fragment ID values and so predict the future ones.
>> All that's required is that two paths go through the same box performing
>> fragmentation.
>>
>> Is that a fair summary?
>>
>> If yes, we can make this a bit harder by mixing in some
>> data per input and/or output devices.
>>
>> For example, just to give you the idea:
>>
>> diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
>> index 683d493..4faa7ef 100644
>> --- a/net/core/dev.c
>> +++ b/net/core/dev.c
>> @@ -3625,6 +3625,7 @@ static int __netif_receive_skb_core(struct sk_buff *skb, bool pfmemalloc)
>>  	trace_netif_receive_skb(skb);
>>  
>>  	orig_dev = skb->dev;
>> +	skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id = skb->dev->ifindex;
>>  
>>  	skb_reset_network_header(skb);
>>  	if (!skb_transport_header_was_set(skb))
>> diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
>> index ce69a12..819a821 100644
>> --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
>> +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
>> @@ -1092,7 +1092,8 @@ static inline int ip6_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
>>  				     sizeof(struct frag_hdr)) & ~7;
>>  	skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
>>  	ipv6_select_ident(&fhdr, rt);
>> -	skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id = fhdr.identification;
>> +	skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id = jhash_1word(skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id,
>> +						   fhdr.identification);
>>  
>>  append:
>>  	return skb_append_datato_frags(sk, skb, getfrag, from,
>>
> 
> I thought about mixing in the incoming interface identifier into the
> frag id generation, but that could hurt us badly as soon as a VM has
> more than one interface to the outside world and uses e.g. ECMP. We need
> to make sure that those frag ids are unique and the kernel needs to be
> better than just using a random number generator.
>

So the goal behind this series of patches is to restore VM functionality to
pre-916e4cf46d0204 ("ipv6: reuse ip6_frag_id from ip6_ufo_append_data").

-vlad

> Bye,
> Hannes
> 
> 

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