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Date:	Thu,  7 Jul 2016 19:15:22 -0700
From:	Brenden Blanco <bblanco@...mgrid.com>
To:	davem@...emloft.net, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Brenden Blanco <bblanco@...mgrid.com>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>,
	Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@...hat.com>,
	Ari Saha <as754m@....com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
	Or Gerlitz <gerlitz.or@...il.com>, john.fastabend@...il.com,
	hannes@...essinduktion.org, Thomas Graf <tgraf@...g.ch>,
	Tom Herbert <tom@...bertland.com>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Subject: [PATCH v6 10/12] bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs

For forwarding to be effective, XDP programs should be allowed to
rewrite packet data.

This requires that the drivers supporting XDP must all map the packet
memory as TODEVICE or BIDIRECTIONAL before invoking the program.

Signed-off-by: Brenden Blanco <bblanco@...mgrid.com>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index a8d67d0..f72f23b 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -653,6 +653,16 @@ static int check_map_access(struct verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
 
 #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff
 
+static bool may_write_pkt_data(enum bpf_prog_type type)
+{
+	switch (type) {
+	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP:
+		return true;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
 static int check_packet_access(struct verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
 			       int size)
 {
@@ -806,10 +816,15 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
 			err = check_stack_read(state, off, size, value_regno);
 		}
 	} else if (state->regs[regno].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
-		if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
+		if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_write_pkt_data(env->prog->type)) {
 			verbose("cannot write into packet\n");
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
+		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
+		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
+			verbose("R%d leaks addr into packet\n", value_regno);
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
 		err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size);
 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
 			mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
-- 
2.8.2

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