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Date:   Sun, 5 Mar 2017 11:53:54 +0100
From:   Dmitry Vyukov <>
To:     Eric Dumazet <>
Cc:     David Ahern <>,
        Mahesh Bandewar <>,
        Eric Dumazet <>,
        David Miller <>,
        Alexey Kuznetsov <>,
        James Morris <>,
        Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <>,
        Patrick McHardy <>,
        netdev <>,
        LKML <>,
        Cong Wang <>,
        syzkaller <>
Subject: Re: net: heap out-of-bounds in fib6_clean_node/rt6_fill_node/fib6_age/fib6_prune_clone

On Sat, Mar 4, 2017 at 9:15 PM, Eric Dumazet <> wrote:
>> > On 3/3/17 6:39 AM, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
>> >> I am getting heap out-of-bounds reports in
>> >> fib6_clean_node/rt6_fill_node/fib6_age/fib6_prune_clone while running
>> >> syzkaller fuzzer on 86292b33d4b79ee03e2f43ea0381ef85f077c760. They all
>> >> follow the same pattern: an object of size 216 is allocated from
>> >> ip_dst_cache slab, and then accessed at offset 272/276 withing
>> >> fib6_walk. Looks like type confusion. Unfortunately this is not
>> >> reproducible.
>> >
>> > I'll take a look this weekend or Monday at the latest.
>> I've got some additional useful info on this. I think this is
>> use-after-free rather than out-of-bounds. I've collected stack where
>> the route was disposed with call_rcu, see the last "Disposed" stack.
>> The crash happens when cmpxchg in rt_cache_route replaces an existing
>> route. And that route seems to have some existing pointers to it
>> (rt->dst.rt6_next) which fib6_walk uses to get to it after its
>> deletion.
> rt_cache_route() deals with IPv4 routes.
> We somehow mix IPv4 and IPv6 dsts in IPv6 tree.
> We need to add type safety at IPV6 route insertions to catch the
> offender.

If you suggest additional checks, I will collect stacks.

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