Date:   Thu, 8 Jun 2017 14:20:13 -0700
From:   Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
To:     Edward Cree <ecree@...arflare.com>
Cc:     davem@...emloft.net, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        iovisor-dev <iovisor-dev@...ts.iovisor.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH net-next 2/5] bpf/verifier: rework value tracking

On Thu, Jun 08, 2017 at 08:38:29PM +0100, Edward Cree wrote:
> On 08/06/17 17:45, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 08, 2017 at 03:53:36PM +0100, Edward Cree wrote:
> >>>>  
> >>>> -	} else if (reg->type == FRAME_PTR || reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
> >>>> +	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
> >>>> +		/* stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we can
> >>>> +		 * determine what type of data were returned.
> >>>> +		 */
> >>>> +		if (reg->align.mask) {
> >>>> +			char tn_buf[48];
> >>>> +
> >>>> +			tn_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->align);
> >>>> +			verbose("variable stack access align=%s off=%d size=%d",
> >>>> +				tn_buf, off, size);
> >>>> +			return -EACCES;
> >>> hmm. why this restriction?
> >>> I thought one of key points of the diff that ptr+var tracking logic
> >>> will now apply not only to map_value, but to stack_ptr as well?
> >> As the comment above it says, we need to determine what was returned:
> >>  was it STACK_MISC or STACK_SPILL, and if the latter, what kind of pointer
> >>  was spilled there?  See check_stack_read(), which I should probably
> >>  mention in the comment.
> > this piece of code is not only spill/fill, but normal ldx/stx stack access.
> > Consider the frequent pattern that many folks tried to do:
> > bpf_prog()
> > {
> >   char buf[64];
> >   int len;
> >
> >   bpf_probe_read(&len, sizeof(len), kernel_ptr_to_filename_len);
> >   bpf_probe_read(buf, sizeof(buf), kernel_ptr_to_filename);
> >   buf[len & (sizeof(buf) - 1)] = 0;
> > ...
> >
> > currently above is not supported, but when 'buf' is a pointer to map value
> > it works fine. Allocating extra bpf map just to do such workaround
> > isn't nice and since this patch generalized map_value_adj with ptr_to_stack
> > we can support above code too.
> > We can check that all bytes of stack for this variable access were
> > initialized already.
> > In the example above it will happen by bpf_probe_read (in the verifier code):
> >         for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
> >                 err = check_mem_access(env, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, BPF_WRITE, -1);
> > so at the time of
> >   buf[len & ..] = 0
> > we can check that 'stx' is within the range of inited stack and allow it.
> Yes, we could check every byte of the stack within the range [buf, buf+63]
>  is a STACK_MISC and if so allow it.  But since this is not supported by the
>  existing code (so it's not a regression), I'd prefer to leave that for a
>  future patch - this one is quite big enough already ;-)

of course! just exploring.

> >>>> +	if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ &&
> >>>> +	    state->regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
> >>>> +		/* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */
> >>>> +		state->regs[value_regno].align.value &= (1ULL << (size * 8)) - 1;
> >>>> +		state->regs[value_regno].align.mask &= (1ULL << (size * 8)) - 1;
> >>> probably another helper from tnum.h is needed.
> >> I could rewrite as
> >>  reg->align = tn_and(reg->align, tn_const((1ULL << (size * 8)) - 1))
> > yep. that's perfect.
> In the end I settled on adding a helper
>     struct tnum tnum_cast(struct tnum a, u8 size);
>  since I have a bunch of other places that cast things to 32 bits.

sounds good to me

> > I see. May be print verifier state in such warn_ons and make error
> > more human readable?
> Good idea, I'll do that.
> >>>> +	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
> >>> does this new state comparison logic helps? Do you have any numbers before/after in the number of insns it had to process for the tests in selftests ?
> >> I don't have the numbers, no (I'll try to collect them).  This rewrite was
> > Thanks. The main concern is that right now some complex programs
> > that cilium is using are close to the verifier complexity limit and these
> > big changes to amount of info recognized by the verifier can cause pruning
> > to be ineffective, so we need to test on big programs.
> > I think Daniel will be happy to test your next rev of the patches.
> > I'll test them as well.
> > At least 'insn_processed' from C code in tools/testing/selftests/bpf/
> > is a good estimate of how these changes affect pruning.
> It looks like the only place this gets recorded is as "processed %d insns"
>  in the log_buf.  Is there a convenient way to get at this, or am I going
>  to have to make bpf_verify_program grovel through the log sscanf()ing for
>  a matching line?

typically we just run the tests with hacked log_level and grep.
similar stuff Dave did in test_align.c

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