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Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2017 10:07:28 -0700
From: Tom Herbert <tom@...bertland.com>
To: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>
Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@...ntonium.net>,
Linux Kernel Network Developers <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Rohit Seth <rohit@...ntonium.net>,
Dave Watson <davejwatson@...com>,
john fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 net-next 3/5] sock: ULP infrastructure
On Tue, Aug 8, 2017 at 9:38 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa
<hannes@...essinduktion.org> wrote:
> Tom Herbert <tom@...ntonium.net> writes:
>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
>> + if (!ulp && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
>> + rcu_read_unlock();
>> + request_module("%s", name);
>> + rcu_read_lock();
>> + ulp = ulp_find(name);
>> + }
>> +#endif
>
> It looks to me that this allows users with only CAP_NET_ADMIN
> privileges to load every module?
It's a carryover. Probably should remove the check.
Tom
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