netdev - [PATCH net] gso: validate gso_type if SKB_GSO

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Date:   Wed, 17 Jan 2018 18:11:26 -0500
From:   Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>
To:     netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     davem@...emloft.net, edumazet@...gle.com,
        Willem de Bruijn <willemb@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH net] gso: validate gso_type if SKB_GSO_DODGY

From: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@...gle.com>

Validate gso_type of untrusted SKB_GSO_DODGY packets during
segmentation.

Untrusted user packets are limited to a small set of gso types in
virtio_net_hdr_to_skb. But segmentation occurs on packet contents.
Syzkaller was able to enter gso callbacks that are not hardened
against untrusted user input.

Fixes: f43798c27684 ("tun: Allow GSO using virtio_net_hdr")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<001a1137452496ffc305617e5fe0@...gle.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+fee64147a25aecd48055@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@...gle.com>
---
 net/ipv4/af_inet.c     | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
index f00499a46927..d5a36827f7b1 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
@@ -1220,6 +1220,25 @@ int inet_sk_rebuild_header(struct sock *sk)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_sk_rebuild_header);
 
+static bool inet_gso_validate_dodgy(struct sk_buff *skb, int ipproto)
+{
+	unsigned int gso_type = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type;
+
+	if (gso_type & SKB_GSO_DODGY) {
+		switch (gso_type & ~SKB_GSO_DODGY) {
+		case SKB_GSO_TCPV4:
+		case SKB_GSO_TCPV4 | SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN:
+			return ipproto == IPPROTO_TCP;
+		case SKB_GSO_UDP:
+			return ipproto == IPPROTO_UDP;
+		default:
+			return false;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 struct sk_buff *inet_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 netdev_features_t features)
 {
@@ -1245,6 +1264,8 @@ struct sk_buff *inet_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 	id = ntohs(iph->id);
 	proto = iph->protocol;
+	if (!inet_gso_validate_dodgy(skb, proto))
+		goto out;
 
 	/* Warning: after this point, iph might be no longer valid */
 	if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, ihl)))
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c
index 4a87f9428ca5..662e16548104 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c
@@ -55,6 +55,25 @@ static int ipv6_gso_pull_exthdrs(struct sk_buff *skb, int proto)
 	return proto;
 }
 
+static bool ipv6_gso_validate_dodgy(struct sk_buff *skb, int ipproto)
+{
+	unsigned int gso_type = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type;
+
+	if (gso_type & SKB_GSO_DODGY) {
+		switch (gso_type & ~SKB_GSO_DODGY) {
+		case SKB_GSO_TCPV6:
+		case SKB_GSO_TCPV6 | SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN:
+			return ipproto == IPPROTO_TCP;
+		case SKB_GSO_UDP:
+			return ipproto == IPPROTO_UDP;
+		default:
+			return false;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 static struct sk_buff *ipv6_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	netdev_features_t features)
 {
@@ -82,10 +101,12 @@ static struct sk_buff *ipv6_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 	ipv6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
 	__skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*ipv6h));
-	segs = ERR_PTR(-EPROTONOSUPPORT);
 
 	proto = ipv6_gso_pull_exthdrs(skb, ipv6h->nexthdr);
+	if (!ipv6_gso_validate_dodgy(skb, proto))
+		goto out;
 
+	segs = ERR_PTR(-EPROTONOSUPPORT);
 	if (skb->encapsulation &&
 	    skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & (SKB_GSO_IPXIP4 | SKB_GSO_IPXIP6))
 		udpfrag = proto == IPPROTO_UDP && encap;
-- 
2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog