netdev - [PATCH] sctp: verify size of a new chunk in _sctp_make

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Date:   Fri,  9 Feb 2018 16:02:31 +0300
From:   Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@...cle.com>
To:     netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@...il.com>,
        Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>,
        Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@...il.com>,
        David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>, linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org,
        Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@...cle.com>
Subject: [PATCH] sctp: verify size of a new chunk in _sctp_make_chunk()

When SCTP makes INIT or INIT_ACK packets the total chunk length
can exceed SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN which leads to kernel panic when
transmitting these packets, e.g. the crash on sending INIT_ACK:

[  597.804948] skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:00000000ffae06e4 len:120168
               put:120156 head:000000007aa47635 data:00000000d991c2de
               tail:0x1d640 end:0xfec0 dev:<NULL>
...
[  597.976970] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  598.033408] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:104!
[  600.314841] Call Trace:
[  600.345829]  <IRQ>
[  600.371639]  ? sctp_packet_transmit+0x2095/0x26d0 [sctp]
[  600.436934]  skb_put+0x16c/0x200
[  600.477295]  sctp_packet_transmit+0x2095/0x26d0 [sctp]
[  600.540630]  ? sctp_packet_config+0x890/0x890 [sctp]
[  600.601781]  ? __sctp_packet_append_chunk+0x3b4/0xd00 [sctp]
[  600.671356]  ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x3f/0x90 [sctp]
[  600.731482]  sctp_outq_flush+0x663/0x30d0 [sctp]
[  600.788565]  ? sctp_make_init+0xbf0/0xbf0 [sctp]
[  600.845555]  ? sctp_check_transmitted+0x18f0/0x18f0 [sctp]
[  600.912945]  ? sctp_outq_tail+0x631/0x9d0 [sctp]
[  600.969936]  sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0x3be1/0x5cb0 [sctp]
[  601.041593]  ? sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x85f/0xc30 [sctp]
[  601.104837]  ? sctp_generate_t1_cookie_event+0x20/0x20 [sctp]
[  601.175436]  ? sctp_eat_data+0x1710/0x1710 [sctp]
[  601.233575]  sctp_do_sm+0x182/0x560 [sctp]
[  601.284328]  ? sctp_has_association+0x70/0x70 [sctp]
[  601.345586]  ? sctp_rcv+0xef4/0x32f0 [sctp]
[  601.397478]  ? sctp6_rcv+0xa/0x20 [sctp]
...

Here the chunk size for INIT_ACK packet becomes too big, mostly
because of the state cookie (INIT packet has large size with
many address parameters), plus additional server parameters.

Later this chunk causes the panic in skb_put_data():

  skb_packet_transmit()
      sctp_packet_pack()
          skb_put_data(nskb, chunk->skb->data, chunk->skb->len);

'nskb' (head skb) was previously allocated with packet->size
from u16 'chunk->chunk_hdr->length'.

As suggested by Marcelo we should check the chunk's length in
_sctp_make_chunk() before trying to allocate skb for it and
discard a chunk if its size bigger than SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@...cle.com>
---
 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index 793b05e..95618eb 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -1380,9 +1380,14 @@ void sctp_init_addrs(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, union sctp_addr *src,
 	struct sctp_chunk *retval;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	struct sock *sk;
+	int chunklen;
+
+	chunklen = sizeof(*chunk_hdr) + paylen;
+	if (chunklen > SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN)
+		goto nodata;
 
 	/* No need to allocate LL here, as this is only a chunk. */
-	skb = alloc_skb(SCTP_PAD4(sizeof(*chunk_hdr) + paylen), gfp);
+	skb = alloc_skb(SCTP_PAD4(chunklen), gfp);
 	if (!skb)
 		goto nodata;
 
-- 
1.7.1