netdev - [PATCH 2/7] netfilter: nf_tables: permit second nat hook if colliding hook is going away

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Date:   Sat, 24 Mar 2018 21:34:18 +0100
From:   Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>
To:     netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     davem@...emloft.net, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/7] netfilter: nf_tables: permit second nat hook if colliding hook is going away

From: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>

Sergei Trofimovich reported that restoring an nft ruleset doesn't work
anymore unless old rule content is flushed first.

The problem stems from a recent change designed to prevent multiple nat
hooks at the same hook point locations and nftables transaction model.

A 'flush ruleset' won't take effect until the entire transaction has
completed.

So, if one has a nft.rules file that contains a 'flush ruleset',
followed by a nat hook register request, then 'nft -f file' will work,
but running 'nft -f file' again will fail with -EBUSY.

Reason is that nftables will place the flush/removal requests in the
transaction list, but it will not act on the removal until after all new
rules are in place.

The netfilter core will therefore get request to register a new nat
hook before the old one is removed -- this now fails as the netfilter
core can't know the existing hook is staged for removal.

To fix this, we can search the transaction log when a hook collision
is detected.  The collision is okay if

 1. there is a delete request pending for the nat hook that is already
    registered.
 2. there is no second add request for a matching nat hook.
    This is required to only apply the exception once.

Fixes: f92b40a8b2645 ("netfilter: core: only allow one nat hook per hook point")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
index 36f69acaf51f..cc8ca00e6e6e 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
@@ -74,15 +74,77 @@ static void nft_trans_destroy(struct nft_trans *trans)
 	kfree(trans);
 }
 
+/* removal requests are queued in the commit_list, but not acted upon
+ * until after all new rules are in place.
+ *
+ * Therefore, nf_register_net_hook(net, &nat_hook) runs before pending
+ * nf_unregister_net_hook().
+ *
+ * nf_register_net_hook thus fails if a nat hook is already in place
+ * even if the conflicting hook is about to be removed.
+ *
+ * If collision is detected, search commit_log for DELCHAIN matching
+ * the new nat hooknum; if we find one collision is temporary:
+ *
+ * Either transaction is aborted (new/colliding hook is removed), or
+ * transaction is committed (old hook is removed).
+ */
+static bool nf_tables_allow_nat_conflict(const struct net *net,
+					 const struct nf_hook_ops *ops)
+{
+	const struct nft_trans *trans;
+	bool ret = false;
+
+	if (!ops->nat_hook)
+		return false;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(trans, &net->nft.commit_list, list) {
+		const struct nf_hook_ops *pending_ops;
+		const struct nft_chain *pending;
+
+		if (trans->msg_type != NFT_MSG_NEWCHAIN &&
+		    trans->msg_type != NFT_MSG_DELCHAIN)
+			continue;
+
+		pending = trans->ctx.chain;
+		if (!nft_is_base_chain(pending))
+			continue;
+
+		pending_ops = &nft_base_chain(pending)->ops;
+		if (pending_ops->nat_hook &&
+		    pending_ops->pf == ops->pf &&
+		    pending_ops->hooknum == ops->hooknum) {
+			/* other hook registration already pending? */
+			if (trans->msg_type == NFT_MSG_NEWCHAIN)
+				return false;
+
+			ret = true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int nf_tables_register_hook(struct net *net,
 				   const struct nft_table *table,
 				   struct nft_chain *chain)
 {
+	struct nf_hook_ops *ops;
+	int ret;
+
 	if (table->flags & NFT_TABLE_F_DORMANT ||
 	    !nft_is_base_chain(chain))
 		return 0;
 
-	return nf_register_net_hook(net, &nft_base_chain(chain)->ops);
+	ops = &nft_base_chain(chain)->ops;
+	ret = nf_register_net_hook(net, ops);
+	if (ret == -EBUSY && nf_tables_allow_nat_conflict(net, ops)) {
+		ops->nat_hook = false;
+		ret = nf_register_net_hook(net, ops);
+		ops->nat_hook = true;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static void nf_tables_unregister_hook(struct net *net,
-- 
2.11.0