netdev - [RFC net-next PATCH 2/2] bpf: disallow XDP data_meta to overlap with xdp

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Date:   Wed, 18 Apr 2018 14:10:16 +0200
From:   Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@...hat.com>
To:     Daniel Borkmann <borkmann@...earbox.net>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
Cc:     netdev@...r.kernel.org, Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@...hat.com>
Subject: [RFC net-next PATCH 2/2] bpf: disallow XDP data_meta to overlap
 with xdp_frame area

If combining xdp_adjust_head and xdp_adjust_meta, then it is possible
to make data_meta overlap with area used by xdp_frame.  And another
invocation of xdp_adjust_head can then clear that area, due to
clearing of xdp_frame area.

The easiest solution I found was to simply not allow
xdp_buff->data_meta to overlap with area used by xdp_frame.

Fixes: 6dfb970d3dbd ("xdp: avoid leaking info stored in frame data on page reuse")
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@...hat.com>
---
 net/core/filter.c |   11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index 15e9b5477360..e3623e741181 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -2701,6 +2701,11 @@ BPF_CALL_2(bpf_xdp_adjust_head, struct xdp_buff *, xdp, int, offset)
 		     data > xdp->data_end - ETH_HLEN))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* Disallow data_meta to use xdp_frame area */
+	if (metalen > 0 &&
+	    unlikely((data - metalen) < xdp_frame_end))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* Avoid info leak, when reusing area prev used by xdp_frame */
 	if (data < xdp_frame_end) {
 		unsigned long clearlen = xdp_frame_end - data;
@@ -2734,6 +2739,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_xdp_adjust_head_proto = {
 
 BPF_CALL_2(bpf_xdp_adjust_meta, struct xdp_buff *, xdp, int, offset)
 {
+	void *xdp_frame_end = xdp->data_hard_start + sizeof(struct xdp_frame);
 	void *meta = xdp->data_meta + offset;
 	unsigned long metalen = xdp->data - meta;
 
@@ -2742,6 +2748,11 @@ BPF_CALL_2(bpf_xdp_adjust_meta, struct xdp_buff *, xdp, int, offset)
 	if (unlikely(meta < xdp->data_hard_start ||
 		     meta > xdp->data))
 		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Disallow data_meta to use xdp_frame area */
+	if (unlikely(meta < xdp_frame_end))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (unlikely((metalen & (sizeof(__u32) - 1)) ||
 		     (metalen > 32)))
 		return -EACCES;