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Date:   Tue, 22 May 2018 14:59:38 -0400
From:   Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To:     Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Cc:     "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>, simo@...hat.com,
        jlayton@...hat.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>, dhowells@...hat.com,
        carlos@...hat.com, linux-audit@...hat.com, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
        luto@...nel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, cgroups@...r.kernel.org,
        serge@...lyn.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH ghak32 V2 13/13] debug audit: read container ID of a process

On Tue, May 22, 2018 at 1:35 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> wrote:
> On 2018-05-21 16:06, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Mon, May 21, 2018 at 3:19 PM, Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
>> > Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com> writes:
>> >> On Friday, March 16, 2018 5:00:40 AM EDT Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
>> >>> Add support for reading the container ID from the proc filesystem.
>> >>
>> >> I think this could be useful in general. Please consider this to be part of
>> >> the full patch set and not something merely used to debug the patches.
>> >
>> > Only with an audit specific name.
>> >
>> > As it is:
>> >
>> > Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
>> >
>> > The truth is the containerid name really stinks and is quite confusing
>> > and does not imply that the label applies only to audit.  And little
>> > things like this make me extremely uncofortable with it.
>>
>> It also makes the audit container ID (notice how I *always* call it
>> the *audit* container ID? that is not an accident) available for
>> userspace applications to abuse.  Perhaps in the future we can look at
>> ways to make this more available to applications, but this patch is
>> not the answer.
>
> Do you have a productive suggestion?

I haven't given it much thought beyond our discussions and until we
get the basic audit container ID support in place (all the other parts
of this patchset) I doubt I'll be giving it much thought.

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

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