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Date:   Tue, 22 May 2018 16:42:40 +0800
From:   Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>
To:     DaeRyong Jeong <threeearcat@...il.com>
Cc:     mst@...hat.com, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, byoungyoung@...due.edu,
        kt0755@...il.com, bammanag@...due.edu
Subject: Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in vhost_chr_write_iter



On 2018年05月22日 16:38, DaeRyong Jeong wrote:
> On Mon, May 21, 2018 at 10:38:10AM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
>> On 2018年05月18日 17:24, Jason Wang wrote:
>>> On 2018年05月17日 21:45, DaeRyong Jeong wrote:
>>>> We report the crash: KASAN: use-after-free Read in vhost_chr_write_iter
>>>>
>>>> This crash has been found in v4.17-rc1 using RaceFuzzer (a modified
>>>> version of Syzkaller), which we describe more at the end of this
>>>> report. Our analysis shows that the race occurs when invoking two
>>>> syscalls concurrently, write$vnet and ioctl$VHOST_RESET_OWNER.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Analysis:
>>>> We think the concurrent execution of vhost_process_iotlb_msg() and
>>>> vhost_dev_cleanup() causes the crash.
>>>> Both of functions can run concurrently (please see call sequence below),
>>>> and possibly, there is a race on dev->iotlb.
>>>> If the switch occurs right after vhost_dev_cleanup() frees
>>>> dev->iotlb, vhost_process_iotlb_msg() still sees the non-null value
>>>> and it
>>>> keep executing without returning -EFAULT. Consequently, use-after-free
>>>> occures
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Thread interleaving:
>>>> CPU0 (vhost_process_iotlb_msg)                CPU1 (vhost_dev_cleanup)
>>>> (In the case of both VHOST_IOTLB_UPDATE and
>>>> VHOST_IOTLB_INVALIDATE)
>>>> =====                            =====
>>>>                              vhost_umem_clean(dev->iotlb);
>>>> if (!dev->iotlb) {
>>>>              ret = -EFAULT;
>>>>                  break;
>>>> }
>>>>                              dev->iotlb = NULL;
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Call Sequence:
>>>> CPU0
>>>> =====
>>>> vhost_net_chr_write_iter
>>>>      vhost_chr_write_iter
>>>>          vhost_process_iotlb_msg
>>>>
>>>> CPU1
>>>> =====
>>>> vhost_net_ioctl
>>>>      vhost_net_reset_owner
>>>>          vhost_dev_reset_owner
>>>>              vhost_dev_cleanup
>>> Thanks a lot for the analysis.
>>>
>>> This could be addressed by simply protect it with dev mutex.
>>>
>>> Will post a patch.
>>>
>> Could you please help to test the attached patch? I've done some smoking
>> test.
>>
>> Thanks
> Sorry to say this, but we don't have a reproducer for this bug since our
> reproducer is being implemented.
>
> This crash had occrued a few times in our fuzzer, so I inspected the code
> manually.
>
> It seems the patch is good for me, but we can't test the patch for now.
> Sorry.
>

No problem.

I'm trying to craft a reproducer, looks not hard.

Thanks

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