lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:   Fri, 06 Jul 2018 08:56:03 +1000
From:   NeilBrown <neilb@...e.com>
To:     Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>, Thomas Graf <tgraf@...g.ch>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc:     netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [4/4] rhashtable: improve rhashtable_walk stability when stop/start used.

On Thu, Jul 05 2018, Paolo Abeni wrote:

> On Tue, 2018-04-24 at 08:29 +1000, NeilBrown wrote:
>> diff --git a/lib/rhashtable.c b/lib/rhashtable.c
>> index 81edf1ab38ab..9427b5766134 100644
>> --- a/lib/rhashtable.c
>> +++ b/lib/rhashtable.c
>> @@ -727,6 +727,7 @@ int rhashtable_walk_start_check(struct rhashtable_iter *iter)
>>  	__acquires(RCU)
>>  {
>>  	struct rhashtable *ht = iter->ht;
>> +	bool rhlist = ht->rhlist;
>>  
>>  	rcu_read_lock();
>>  
>> @@ -735,13 +736,52 @@ int rhashtable_walk_start_check(struct rhashtable_iter *iter)
>>  		list_del(&iter->walker.list);
>>  	spin_unlock(&ht->lock);
>>  
>> -	if (!iter->walker.tbl && !iter->end_of_table) {
>> +	if (iter->end_of_table)
>> +		return 0;
>> +	if (!iter->walker.tbl) {
>>  		iter->walker.tbl = rht_dereference_rcu(ht->tbl, ht);
>>  		iter->slot = 0;
>>  		iter->skip = 0;
>>  		return -EAGAIN;
>>  	}
>>  
>> +	if (iter->p && !rhlist) {
>> +		/*
>> +		 * We need to validate that 'p' is still in the table, and
>> +		 * if so, update 'skip'
>> +		 */
>> +		struct rhash_head *p;
>> +		int skip = 0;
>> +		rht_for_each_rcu(p, iter->walker.tbl, iter->slot) {
>> +			skip++;
>> +			if (p == iter->p) {
>> +				iter->skip = skip;
>> +				goto found;
>> +			}
>> +		}
>> +		iter->p = NULL;
>> +	} else if (iter->p && rhlist) {
>> +		/* Need to validate that 'list' is still in the table, and
>> +		 * if so, update 'skip' and 'p'.
>> +		 */
>> +		struct rhash_head *p;
>> +		struct rhlist_head *list;
>> +		int skip = 0;
>> +		rht_for_each_rcu(p, iter->walker.tbl, iter->slot) {
>> +			for (list = container_of(p, struct rhlist_head, rhead);
>> +			     list;
>> +			     list = rcu_dereference(list->next)) {
>> +				skip++;
>> +				if (list == iter->list) {
>> +					iter->p = p;
>> +					skip = skip;
>> +					goto found;
>> +				}
>> +			}
>> +		}
>> +		iter->p = NULL;
>> +	}
>> +found:
>>  	return 0;
>>  }
>>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rhashtable_walk_start_check);
>
> While testing new code that uses the rhashtable walker, I'm obeserving
> an use after free, that is apparently caused by the above:
>
> [  146.834815] ==================================================================
> [  146.842933] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in inet_frag_worker+0x9f/0x210
> [  146.850120] Read of size 4 at addr ffff881b6b9342d8 by task kworker/13:1/177
> [  146.857984] 
> [  146.859645] CPU: 13 PID: 177 Comm: kworker/13:1 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc3.mirror_unclone_6_frag_dbg+ #1974
> [  146.870128] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.1.7 06/16/2016
> [  146.878478] Workqueue: events inet_frag_worker
> [  146.883433] Call Trace:
> [  146.886162]  dump_stack+0x90/0xe3
> [  146.889861]  print_address_description+0x6a/0x2a0
> [  146.895109]  kasan_report+0x176/0x2d0
> [  146.899193]  ? inet_frag_worker+0x9f/0x210
> [  146.903762]  inet_frag_worker+0x9f/0x210
> [  146.908142]  process_one_work+0x24f/0x6e0
> [  146.912614]  ? process_one_work+0x1a6/0x6e0
> [  146.917285]  worker_thread+0x4e/0x3d0
> [  146.921373]  kthread+0x106/0x140
> [  146.924970]  ? process_one_work+0x6e0/0x6e0
> [  146.929637]  ? kthread_bind+0x10/0x10
> [  146.933723]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
> [  146.937717] 
> [  146.939377] Allocated by task 177:
> [  146.943170]  kasan_kmalloc+0x86/0xb0
> [  146.947158]  __kmalloc_node+0x181/0x430
> [  146.951438]  kvmalloc_node+0x4f/0x70
> [  146.955427]  alloc_bucket_spinlocks+0x34/0xa0
> [  146.960286]  bucket_table_alloc.isra.13+0x61/0x180
> [  146.965630]  rhashtable_rehash_alloc+0x26/0x80
> [  146.970585]  rht_deferred_worker+0x394/0x810
> [  146.975348]  process_one_work+0x24f/0x6e0
> [  146.979819]  worker_thread+0x4e/0x3d0
> [  146.983902]  kthread+0x106/0x140
> [  146.987502]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
> [  146.991487] 
> [  146.993146] Freed by task 90:
> [  146.996455]  __kasan_slab_free+0x11d/0x180
> [  147.001025]  kfree+0x113/0x350
> [  147.004431]  bucket_table_free+0x1c/0x70
> [  147.008806]  rcu_process_callbacks+0x6c8/0x880
> [  147.013762]  __do_softirq+0xd5/0x505
> [  147.017747] 
> [  147.019407] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff881b6b934200
> [  147.019407]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8192 of size 8192
> [  147.033574] The buggy address is located 216 bytes inside of
> [  147.033574]  8192-byte region [ffff881b6b934200, ffff881b6b936200)
> [  147.046773] The buggy address belongs to the page:
> [  147.052116] page:ffffea006dae4c00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff880107c0e400 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
> [  147.063086] flags: 0x17ffffc0008100(slab|head)
> [  147.068043] raw: 0017ffffc0008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff880107c0e400
> [  147.076684] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000030003 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
> [  147.085324] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> [  147.091540] 
> [  147.093210] Memory state around the buggy address:
> [  147.098553]  ffff881b6b934180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> [  147.106613]  ffff881b6b934200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> [  147.114670] >ffff881b6b934280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> [  147.122730]                                                     ^
> [  147.129527]  ffff881b6b934300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> [  147.137587]  ffff881b6b934380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> [  147.145646] ==================================================================
>
> Reverting the above change avoid the issue. 
>
> I *think* that reusing iter->p after a
> rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() is unsafe:
> if the table has been reashed we can still and reuse 'p', but the
> related grace period could be already expired.

Thanks for the report.
It would be unsafe to dereference iter->p, but the code doesn't.
At least, it doesn't dereference it until it has searched through the
table and confirmed that the pointer is still in the table.

Could you please use scripts/faddr2line to identify exactly where the
error is occurring?
e.g
   ./scripts/faddr2line vmlinux.o inet_frag_worker+0x9f/0x210

(any .o which contains inet_frag_worker should work).
Thanks,
NeilBrown

>
> I can't think of any better fix than a revert. Other opinions welcome!
>
> Paolo

Download attachment "signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (833 bytes)

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ