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Date: Tue, 24 Jul 2018 09:49:29 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>,
Alasdair Kergon <agk@...hat.com>,
Rabin Vincent <rabinv@...s.com>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...ysocki.net>,
Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org,
Philipp Reisner <philipp.reisner@...bit.com>,
Lars Ellenberg <lars.ellenberg@...bit.com>,
Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>,
Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@...el.com>,
Mike Snitzer <snitzer@...hat.com>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Johannes Berg <johannes@...solutions.net>,
Tudor-Dan Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@...rochip.com>,
Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@...il.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, dm-devel@...hat.com,
linux-pm@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
drbd-dev@...ts.linbit.com, linux-block@...r.kernel.org,
qat-linux@...el.com, linux-ppp@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, devel@...verdev.osuosl.org,
linux-afs@...ts.infradead.org, linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v6 11/18] dm crypt: Convert essiv from ahash to shash
In preparing to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
removes the discouraged use of AHASH_REQUEST_ON_STACK in favor of the
smaller SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK by converting from ahash-wrapped-shash to
direct shash. By removing a layer of indirection this both improves
performance and reduces stack usage. The stack allocation will be made
a fixed size in a later patch to the crypto subsystem.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
---
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 31 ++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index b61b069c33af..c4c922990090 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ struct crypt_iv_operations {
};
struct iv_essiv_private {
- struct crypto_ahash *hash_tfm;
+ struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
u8 *salt;
};
@@ -327,25 +327,22 @@ static int crypt_iv_plain64be_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
static int crypt_iv_essiv_init(struct crypt_config *cc)
{
struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
- AHASH_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, essiv->hash_tfm);
- struct scatterlist sg;
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, essiv->hash_tfm);
struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
int err;
- sg_init_one(&sg, cc->key, cc->key_size);
- ahash_request_set_tfm(req, essiv->hash_tfm);
- ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
- ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, essiv->salt, cc->key_size);
+ desc->tfm = essiv->hash_tfm;
+ desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
- err = crypto_ahash_digest(req);
- ahash_request_zero(req);
+ err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cc->key, cc->key_size, essiv->salt);
+ shash_desc_zero(desc);
if (err)
return err;
essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt,
- crypto_ahash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm));
+ crypto_shash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm));
if (err)
return err;
@@ -356,7 +353,7 @@ static int crypt_iv_essiv_init(struct crypt_config *cc)
static int crypt_iv_essiv_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc)
{
struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
- unsigned salt_size = crypto_ahash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm);
+ unsigned salt_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm);
struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
int r, err = 0;
@@ -408,7 +405,7 @@ static void crypt_iv_essiv_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
- crypto_free_ahash(essiv->hash_tfm);
+ crypto_free_shash(essiv->hash_tfm);
essiv->hash_tfm = NULL;
kzfree(essiv->salt);
@@ -426,7 +423,7 @@ static int crypt_iv_essiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
const char *opts)
{
struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm = NULL;
- struct crypto_ahash *hash_tfm = NULL;
+ struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm = NULL;
u8 *salt = NULL;
int err;
@@ -436,14 +433,14 @@ static int crypt_iv_essiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
}
/* Allocate hash algorithm */
- hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(opts, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(opts, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm)) {
ti->error = "Error initializing ESSIV hash";
err = PTR_ERR(hash_tfm);
goto bad;
}
- salt = kzalloc(crypto_ahash_digestsize(hash_tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+ salt = kzalloc(crypto_shash_digestsize(hash_tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!salt) {
ti->error = "Error kmallocing salt storage in ESSIV";
err = -ENOMEM;
@@ -454,7 +451,7 @@ static int crypt_iv_essiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.hash_tfm = hash_tfm;
essiv_tfm = alloc_essiv_cipher(cc, ti, salt,
- crypto_ahash_digestsize(hash_tfm));
+ crypto_shash_digestsize(hash_tfm));
if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm)) {
crypt_iv_essiv_dtr(cc);
return PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
@@ -465,7 +462,7 @@ static int crypt_iv_essiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
bad:
if (hash_tfm && !IS_ERR(hash_tfm))
- crypto_free_ahash(hash_tfm);
+ crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm);
kfree(salt);
return err;
}
--
2.17.1
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