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Date:   Fri, 3 Aug 2018 08:46:32 -0700
From:   Dave Watson <davejwatson@...com>
To:     Vakul Garg <vakul.garg@....com>
CC:     "netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Peter Doliwa <peter.doliwa@....com>,
        Boris Pismenny <borisp@...lanox.com>
Subject: Re: Security enhancement proposal for kernel TLS

On 08/02/18 05:23 PM, Vakul Garg wrote:
> > I agree that Boris' patch does what you say it does - it sets keys immediately
> > after CCS instead of after FINISHED message.  I disagree that the kernel tls
> > implementation currently requires that specific ordering, nor do I think that it
> > should require that ordering.
> 
> The current kernel implementation assumes record sequence number to start from '0'.
> If keys have to be set after FINISHED message, then record sequence number need to
> be communicated from user space TLS stack to kernel. IIRC, sequence number is not 
> part of the interface through which key is transferred.

The setsockopt call struct takes the key, iv, salt, and seqno:

struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 {
        struct tls_crypto_info info;
        unsigned char iv[TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE];
        unsigned char key[TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE];
        unsigned char salt[TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE];
        unsigned char rec_seq[TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE];
};

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