netdev - [PATCH net] sctp: frag

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Date:   Tue,  4 Dec 2018 20:27:41 +0100
From:   Jakub Audykowicz <jakub.audykowicz@...il.com>
To:     linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org, vyasevich@...il.com,
        nhorman@...driver.com, marcelo.leitner@...il.com,
        davem@...emloft.net
Cc:     netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        Jakub Audykowicz <jakub.audykowicz@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH net] sctp: frag_point sanity check

If for some reason an association's fragmentation point is zero,
sctp_datamsg_from_user will try to endlessly try to divide a message
into zero-sized chunks. This eventually causes kernel panic due to
running out of memory.

Although this situation is quite unlikely, it has occurred before as
reported. I propose to add this simple last-ditch sanity check due to
the severity of the potential consequences.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Audykowicz <jakub.audykowicz@...il.com>
---
 include/net/sctp/sctp.h | 5 +++++
 net/sctp/chunk.c        | 6 ++++++
 net/sctp/socket.c       | 3 +--
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/sctp/sctp.h b/include/net/sctp/sctp.h
index ab9242e51d9e..2abbc15824af 100644
--- a/include/net/sctp/sctp.h
+++ b/include/net/sctp/sctp.h
@@ -620,4 +620,9 @@ static inline bool sctp_transport_pmtu_check(struct sctp_transport *t)
 	return false;
 }
 
+static inline __u32 sctp_min_frag_point(struct sctp_sock *sp, __u16 datasize)
+{
+	return sctp_mtu_payload(sp, SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT, datasize);
+}
+
 #endif /* __net_sctp_h__ */
diff --git a/net/sctp/chunk.c b/net/sctp/chunk.c
index ce8087846f05..d5b91bc8a377 100644
--- a/net/sctp/chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/chunk.c
@@ -191,6 +191,12 @@ struct sctp_datamsg *sctp_datamsg_from_user(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 	 * the packet
 	 */
 	max_data = asoc->frag_point;
+	if (unlikely(!max_data)) {
+		max_data = sctp_min_frag_point(sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk),
+					       sctp_datachk_len(&asoc->stream));
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("%s: asoc:%p frag_point is zero, forcing max_data to default minimum (%d)",
+				    __func__, asoc, max_data);
+	}
 
 	/* If the the peer requested that we authenticate DATA chunks
 	 * we need to account for bundling of the AUTH chunks along with
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index bf618d1b41fd..b8cebd5a87e5 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -3324,8 +3324,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_maxseg(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, unsigned
 		__u16 datasize = asoc ? sctp_datachk_len(&asoc->stream) :
 				 sizeof(struct sctp_data_chunk);
 
-		min_len = sctp_mtu_payload(sp, SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT,
-					   datasize);
+		min_len = sctp_min_frag_point(sp, datasize);
 		max_len = SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN - datasize;
 
 		if (val < min_len || val > max_len)
-- 
2.17.1