netdev - [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] bpf: drop bpf_verifier

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Date:   Fri, 19 Apr 2019 07:44:55 -0700
From:   Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
To:     <davem@...emloft.net>
CC:     <daniel@...earbox.net>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, <kernel-team@...com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] bpf: drop bpf_verifier_lock

Drop bpf_verifier_lock for root to avoid being DoS-ed by unprivileged.
The BPF verifier is now fully parallel.
All unpriv users are still serialized by bpf_verifier_lock to avoid
exhausting kernel memory by running N parallel verifications.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 5f0eb5bd5589..423f242a5efb 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -8132,9 +8132,11 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
 		env->insn_aux_data[i].orig_idx = i;
 	env->prog = *prog;
 	env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type];
+	is_priv = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
 
 	/* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
-	mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
+	if (!is_priv)
+		mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
 
 	if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) {
 		/* user requested verbose verifier output
@@ -8157,7 +8159,6 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
 	if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT)
 		env->strict_alignment = false;
 
-	is_priv = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
 	env->allow_ptr_leaks = is_priv;
 
 	ret = replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(env);
@@ -8270,7 +8271,8 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
 		release_maps(env);
 	*prog = env->prog;
 err_unlock:
-	mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
+	if (!is_priv)
+		mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
 	vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
 err_free_env:
 	kfree(env);
-- 
2.20.0