netdev - Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Tue, 2 Jul 2019 14:32:08 -0700
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>,
        "linux-security@...r.kernel.org" <linux-security@...r.kernel.org>,
        Networking <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Kernel Team <Kernel-team@...com>,
        Lorenz Bauer <lmb@...udflare.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf

On Tue, Jul 2, 2019 at 2:04 PM Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jul 01, 2019 at 06:59:13PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > I think I'm understanding your motivation.  You're not trying to make
> > bpf() generically usable without privilege -- you're trying to create
> > a way to allow certain users to access dangerous bpf functionality
> > within some limits.
> >
> > That's a perfectly fine goal, but I think you're reinventing the
> > wheel, and the wheel you're reinventing is quite complicated and
> > already exists.  I think you should teach bpftool to be secure when
> > installed setuid root or with fscaps enabled and put your policy in
> > bpftool.  If you want to harden this a little bit, it would seem
> > entirely reasonable to add a new CAP_BPF_ADMIN and change some, but
> > not all, of the capable() checks to check CAP_BPF_ADMIN instead of the
> > capabilities that they currently check.
>
> If finer grained controls are wanted, it does seem like the /dev/bpf
> path makes the most sense. open, request abilities, use fd. The open can
> be mediated by DAC and LSM. The request can be mediated by LSM. This
> provides a way to add policy at the LSM level and at the tool level.
> (i.e. For tool-level controls: leave LSM wide open, make /dev/bpf owned
> by "bpfadmin" and bpftool becomes setuid "bpfadmin". For fine-grained
> controls, leave /dev/bpf wide open and add policy to SELinux, etc.)
>
> With only a new CAP, you don't get the fine-grained controls. (The
> "request abilities" part is the key there.)

Sure you do: the effective set.  It has somewhat bizarre defaults, but
I don't think that's a real problem.  Also, this wouldn't be like
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH -- you can't accidentally use your BPF caps.

I think that a /dev capability-like object isn't totally nuts, but I
think we should do it well, and this patch doesn't really achieve
that.  But I don't think bpf wants fine-grained controls like this at
all -- as I pointed upthread, a fine-grained solution really wants
different treatment for the different capable() checks, and a bunch of
them won't resemble capabilities or /dev/bpf at all.