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Date: Sat, 11 Jan 2014 11:43:56 +0400
From: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Lyra, Password Key Derivation Based On The Sponge Construction

I am just catching up with this thread (as well as with some other
postings in here that I didn't get around to reading in time), but FWIW
I posted some comments on the Lyra presentation slides here:

http://www.openwall.com/lists/crypt-dev/2014/01/11/1

On Thu, Jan 09, 2014 at 10:58:09AM -0500, Bill Cox wrote:
> SFAIK, there's no reason memory needs to appear truly random.  For example,
> if Alexander were to use Salsa20/20 instead of Salsa20/8 in escrypt, but
> instead of writing out only the resulting hash he wrote out every
> intermediate computed value (there are very many values computed in
> Salsa20/20), he could easily fill memory as rapidly as he liked.

I had thought of that.  One of the reasons I didn't do it yet is that
it's actually quite similar to simply reducing the Salsa20 rounds count
(which I can easily experiment with already), with the difference being
some extra ADDs (in Salsa20 finalization) and XORs (in BlockMix).  Yes,
I could save a few cycles by avoiding those ADDs and maybe also the XORs
(only in SMix's first loop?) and instead chaining Salsa20 rounds
directly, like it's normally done during Salsa20/N computation.
A reason why I didn't do it yet is staying closer to scrypt, so that
classic scrypt may still be provided in the same source tree, and so
that much of the shared code may even be tested against scrypt test
vectors (when running in classic scrypt mode).  Yet another reason is
that BlockMix might then need to differ between SMix's first and second
loop (if I were to save on the XORs in first loop).  This is becoming
off-topic for the thread on Lyra, though.

Alexander

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