phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] Combining sliding window and bit-reversal

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2014 02:23:40 +0400
From: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Combining sliding window and bit-reversal

On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 04:54:27PM -0500, Bill Cox wrote:
> I was comparing Catena-3 graphs to Alexander's power-of-two graphs,
> and both did well in different areas.  Then I though, how about
> combining them?  So, instead of picking random locations within the

By "random locations", do you mean secret-dependent (leaky) or not?

> sliding window, I pick bit-reversal based locations.  This results in
> the hardest to pebble DAGs so far for my pebbling algorithm.

This is good news.  I was going to try the same for the cache timing
resistant portion of computation in escrypt.

It is curious (and unexpected by me) that bit reversal is better than
"random" permutation.  I thought of also trying e.g. TEA block cipher at
changing block size (to match the current sliding window size) and very
low round count as an alternative to bit reversal.  It could be
implementable in roughly as many instructions as bit reversal on CPUs
lacking a bit reversal instruction.

> I'm thinking of using this without password dependent memory location
> reads for the first 50%, and then for the last 50%, I'll use the
> existing NoelKDF DAG, which will have a ton of edges back into the
> sliding bit-reversal DAG.

Yes, I was thinking of doing something similar, except I'd probably pick
50% of SMix first loop for secret-independent indexing, which translates
to 25% of total running time and 1/12 of total AT cost.  Yes, 1/12 is
not a lot, yet it may be a good tradeoff considering that cache timing
attacks will likely be far less common than regular offline attacks.

Alexander