phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] Why protect against side channel attacks

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Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2015 03:33:24 +0100
From: Peter Maxwell <peter@...icient.co.uk>
To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: Re: [PHC] Why protect against side channel attacks

On 25 June 2015 at 02:45, Marsh Ray <maray@...rosoft.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> I don’t recall if the PHC analysis considered this question explicitly for
> those functions with password-derived access patterns.
>
>
>
> It’s probably a moot point for a couple of reasons:
>
> * It doesn’t sound like we’re actually contemplating a function with a
> password-derived access pattern side channel, and
>

Are there any candidates that use the password, or password derived data,
at any point to derive the memory access pattern?  For example, does the
password get mixed-in in any way and then the result used to determine the
memory access pattern?

If the memory access pattern is completely invariant of the password then
I don't see a problem.

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