bugtraq - [OpenPKG-SA-2003.014] OpenPKG Security Advisory (tcpdump)

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Message-ID: <20030304110426.GA95079@en4.engelschall.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2003 12:04:26 +0100
From: OpenPKG <openpkg@...npkg.org>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: [OpenPKG-SA-2003.014] OpenPKG Security Advisory (tcpdump)

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________________________________________________________________________

OpenPKG Security Advisory                            The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html              http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-security@...npkg.org                         openpkg@...npkg.org
OpenPKG-SA-2003.014                                          04-Mar-2003
________________________________________________________________________

Package:             tcpdump
Vulnerability:       denial of service
OpenPKG Specific:    no

Affected Releases:   Affected Packages:        Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT      <= tcpdump-3.7.1-20020822 >= tcpdump-3.7.2-20030227
OpenPKG 1.2          <= tcpdump-3.7.1-1.2.0    >= tcpdump-3.7.1-1.2.1
OpenPKG 1.1          <= tcpdump-3.7.1-1.1.0    >= tcpdump-3.7.1-1.1.1

Dependent Packages:  none

Description:
  Andrew Griffiths and iDEFENSE Labs discovered [1] a vulnerability in
  tcpdump [0] which can result in a Denial of Service (DoS) attack due
  to an endless processing loop consuming CPU resources when parsing
  malformed ISAKMP packets (UDP, port 500). The Common Vulnerabilities
  and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2003-0108 [2] to the
  problem.

  Similarily, another DoS attack is possible because tcpdump enters
  also an endless processing loop consuming CPU resources when parsing
  malformed BGP packets (TCP, port 179). Finally, a buffer overflow is
  possible when parsing malformed NFS packets (UDP, port 2049).

  Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q
  tcpdump". If you have the "tcpdump" package installed and its version is
  affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it (see 
  Solution) and it's dependent packages (see above), if any, too. [3][4]

Solution:
  Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
  [5][6], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [7][8] or a mirror
  location, verify its integrity [9], build a corresponding binary RPM
  from it [3] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the
  binary RPM [4]. For the current release OpenPKG 1.2, perform the
  following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for
  other releases adjust accordingly).

  $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
  ftp> bin
  ftp> cd release/1.2/UPD
  ftp> get tcpdump-3.7.1-1.2.1.src.rpm
  ftp> bye
  $ <prefix>/bin/rpm -v --checksig tcpdump-3.7.1-1.2.1.src.rpm
  $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild tcpdump-3.7.1-1.2.1.src.rpm
  $ su -
  # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/tcpdump-3.7.1-1.2.1.*.rpm
________________________________________________________________________

References:
  [0] http://www.tcpdump.org/
  [1] http://www.idefense.com/advisory/02.27.03.txt
  [2] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0108
  [3] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
  [4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
  [5] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/tcpdump-3.7.1-1.1.1.src.rpm
  [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/tcpdump-3.7.1-1.2.1.src.rpm
  [7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/
  [8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/
  [9] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
________________________________________________________________________

For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with
the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@...npkg.org>" (ID 63C4CB9F)
of the OpenPKG project which you can find under the official URL
http://www.openpkg.org/openpkg.pgp or on http://keyserver.pgp.com/. To
check the integrity of this advisory, verify its digital signature by
using GnuPG (http://www.gnupg.org/). For instance, pipe this message to
the command "gpg --verify --keyserver keyserver.pgp.com".
________________________________________________________________________

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