Date: Tue, 18 Mar 2003 11:19:49 +0100
From: OpenPKG <openpkg@...npkg.org>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: [OpenPKG-SA-2003.019] OpenPKG Security Advisory (openssl)


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________________________________________________________________________

OpenPKG Security Advisory                            The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html              http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-security@...npkg.org                         openpkg@...npkg.org
OpenPKG-SA-2003.019                                          18-Mar-2003
________________________________________________________________________

Package:             openssl
Vulnerability:       local and remote extraction of RSA private key
OpenPKG Specific:    no

Affected Releases:   Affected Packages:         Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT      <= openssl-0.9.7a-20030219 >= openssl-0.9.7a-20030317
OpenPKG 1.2          <= openssl-0.9.7-1.2.1     >= openssl-0.9.7-1.2.2
OpenPKG 1.1          <= openssl-0.9.6g-1.1.1    >= openssl-0.9.6g-1.1.2

Affected Releases:   Dependent Packages:

OpenPKG CURRENT      apache cadaver cpu curl dsniff easysoap ethereal
                     exim fetchmail imap imapd inn linc links lynx mico
                     mixmaster mozilla mutt nail neon openldap openvpn
                     perl-ssl postfix postgresql qpopper samba sendmail
                     siege sio sitecopy socat stunnel subversion sysmon
                     w3m wget

OpenPKG 1.2          apache cpu curl ethereal fetchmail imap inn
                     links lynx mico mutt nail neon openldap perl-ssl
                     postfix postgresql qpopper samba sendmail siege
                     sitecopy socat stunnel sysmon w3m wget

OpenPKG 1.1          apache curl fetchmail inn links lynx mutt neon
                     openldap perl-ssl postfix postgresql qpopper samba
                     siege sitecopy socat stunnel sysmon w3m

Description:
  David Brumley and Dan Boneh of Stanford University have researched
  and documented a timing attack on OpenSSL which allows local and
  remote attackers to extract the RSA private key of a server. [0] The
  OpenSSL [1] RSA implementation is generally vulnerable to these type
  of attacks unless RSA blinding has been turned on [2].
  
  Typically, RSA blinding is not enabled by OpenSSL based applications,
  mainly because it is not obvious how to do so when using OpenSSL to
  provide SSL/TLS. This problem affects mostly all applications using
  OpenSSL and have to be rebuilded against the fixed OpenSSL version
  (where RSA blinding is now enabled by default) or have to enable RSA
  blinding explicitly their own.
  
  The performance impact of RSA blinding appears to be small (a few
  percent only) and the RSA functionality is still fully compatible. The
  Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id
  CAN-2003-0147 [3] to the problem.

  Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q
  openssl". If you have the "openssl" package installed and its version
  is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it
  (see Solution) and it's dependent packages (see above), if any, too.
  [4][5]

Solution:
  Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
  [6][7], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [8][9] or a mirror
  location, verify its integrity [10], build a corresponding binary RPM
  from it [4] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary
  RPM [5]. For the current release OpenPKG 1.2, perform the following
  operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases
  adjust accordingly).

  $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
  ftp> bin
  ftp> cd release/1.2/UPD
  ftp> get openssl-0.9.7-1.2.2.src.rpm
  ftp> bye
  $ <prefix>/bin/rpm -v --checksig openssl-0.9.7-1.2.2.src.rpm
  $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild openssl-0.9.7-1.2.2.src.rpm
  $ su -
  # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/openssl-0.9.7-1.2.2.*.rpm

  Additionally, you have to rebuild and reinstall all dependent 
  packages (see above), too. [4][5]
________________________________________________________________________

References:
  [0] http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf
  [1] http://www.openssl.org/
  [2] http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030317.txt
  [3] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0147
  [4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
  [5] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
  [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/openssl-0.9.6g-1.1.2.src.rpm
  [7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/openssl-0.9.7-1.2.2.src.rpm
  [8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/
  [9] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/
  [10] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
________________________________________________________________________

For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with
the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@...npkg.org>" (ID 63C4CB9F)
of the OpenPKG project which you can find under the official URL
http://www.openpkg.org/openpkg.pgp or on http://keyserver.pgp.com/. To
check the integrity of this advisory, verify its digital signature by
using GnuPG (http://www.gnupg.org/). For instance, pipe this message to
the command "gpg --verify --keyserver keyserver.pgp.com".
________________________________________________________________________

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