Message-ID: <3ED3AC18.60001@coresecurity.com>
Date: Tue, 27 May 2003 15:19:04 -0300
From: CORE Security Technologies Advisories <advisories@...esecurity.com>
To: Bugtraq <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>,
	Vulnwatch <vulnwatch@...nwatch.org>,
	full-disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com>
Subject: CORE-2003-0403: Axis Network Camera HTTP Authentication Bypass


                         Core Security Technologies Advisory
                             http://www.coresecurity.com

                    Axis Network Camera HTTP Authentication Bypass



Date Published: 2003-05-27

Last Update: 2003-05-23

Advisory ID: CORE-2003-0403

Bugtraq ID: 7652

CVE Name: CAN-2003-0240

Title: Axis Network Camera HTTP Authentication Bypass

Class: Access Validation Error

Remotely Exploitable: Yes

Locally Exploitable: No

Advisory URL:
  http://www.coresecurity.com/common/showdoc.php?idx=329&idxseccion=10

Vendors contacted:
  - Axis Communications
    . Core Notification: 2003-04-10
    . Notification acknowledged by Axis: 2003-04-17
    . 2.34 Release candidate for the Axis 2400/2401 Video Servers
      available: 2003-04-17
    . Fixed versions available for all affected products: 2003-05-27

Release Mode: COORDINATED RELEASE


*Vulnerability Description:*

  An Axis Network Camera captures and transmits live images directly
  over an IP network (e.g. LAN/intranet/Internet), enabling users to
  remotely view and/or manage the camera from a Web browser on any
  computer. For more information see http://www.axis.com

  After setting up the Axis Camera, the user is provided with
  Web-based Administration Tools for configuring and managing the
  camera by accessing http://camera-ip/admin/admin.shtml, which
  requires a username and password.

  We have discovered the following security vulnerability: by accessing
     http://camera-ip//admin/admin.shtml
  (notice the double slash) the authentication for "admin" is bypassed
  and an attacker gains direct access to the configuration.

  Using this vulnerability, an attacker can reset the root password,
  then enable the telnet server by modifying configuration files,
  giving the attacker interactive access to a Unix like command line,
  allowing her to execute arbitrary commands as root.


*Vulnerable Packages:*

  . AXIS 2100 Network Camera versions 2.32 and previous
  . AXIS 2110 Network Camera versions 2.32 and previous
  . AXIS 2120 Network Camera versions 2.32 and previous
  . AXIS 2130 PTZ Network Camera versions 2.32 and previous
  . AXIS 2400 Video Server versions 2.32 and previous
  . AXIS 2401 Video Server versions 2.32 and previous
  . AXIS 2420 Network Camera versions 2.32 and previous
  . AXIS 2460 Network DVR versions 3.00 and previous
  . AXIS 250S Video Server versions 3.02 and previous


*Solution/Vendor Information/Workaround:*

  Axis Communications has released new firmwares closing this
  vulnerability in its Network Camera and Video Server products.

  New releases are available at:

  AXIS 2100 Network Camera: 2.34
   ftp://ftp.axis.com/pub_soft/cam_srv/cam_2100/2_34/

  AXIS 2110 Network Camera: 2.34
   ftp://ftp.axis.com/pub_soft/cam_srv/cam_2110/2_34/

  AXIS 2120 Network Camera: 2.34
   ftp://ftp.axis.com/pub_soft/cam_srv/cam_2120/2_34/

  AXIS 2130 Network Camera: 2.34
   ftp://ftp.axis.com/pub_soft/cam_srv/cam_2130/2_34/

  AXIS 2400 Video Server: 2.34
   ftp://ftp.axis.com/pub_soft/cam_srv/cam_2400/2_34/

  AXIS 2401 Video Server: 2.34
   ftp://ftp.axis.com/pub_soft/cam_srv/cam_2401/2_34/

  AXIS 2420 Network Camera: 2.34
   ftp://ftp.axis.com/pub_soft/cam_srv/cam_2420/2_34/

  AXIS 2460 Network DVR: 3.10
   ftp://ftp.axis.com/pub_soft/cam_srv/cam_2460/3_10/

  AXIS 250S Video Server: 3.03
   ftp://ftp.axis.com/pub_soft/cam_srv/cam_250s/3_03/

  Recommended Actions:
  We strongly recommend that all devices are updated to these
  firmware versions.


*Credits:*

  This vulnerability was found by Juliano Rizzo from Core Security
  Technologies.

  We wish to thank Joacim Tullberg from Axis for his quick response to
  this issue.


*Technical Description - Exploit/Concept Code:*

  We have discovered the following security vulnerability: by accessing
   http://camera-ip//admin/admin.shtml
  (notice the double slash) the authentication for "admin" is bypassed
  and an attacker gains direct access to the configuration.

  In the same way, an attacker can access the other administration
  tools for the camera, for example:
   http://camera-ip//admin/img_general.shtml
   http://camera-ip//admin/netw_tcp.shtml
   http://camera-ip//admin/sys_date.shtml
   http://camera-ip//admin/com_port.shtml
   http://camera-ip//admin/op_general.shtml
   http://camera-ip//admin/sys_motiond.shtml

  Note that the workaround for a recently published Axis HTTP Server
  vulnerability (see reference [1]) was to add authentication to
  some particular paths. With this vulnerability the authentication
  can be bypassed, so the mentioned Information Disclosure
  vulnerability can still be exploited.

  The affected Axis devices run a Linux like operating system. With
  this vulnerability an attacker can reset the root password. Then
  using the default open ftp server, the attacker can download
  configuration files, modify these files and upload them again.
  Modifying /etc/inittab it is possible to enable the Telnet server
  (see [2] a technical note explaining how to enable Telnet support),
  giving the attacker interactive access to a Unix like command line.
  Axis provides free developer tools (see [3]), so it is feasible
  for an attacker to build tools like port scanners or proxies to
  start attacks from the compromised camera (which are usually
  installed inside internal networks) which could lead to the
  compromise of the internal network.


*References:*

  [1] Axis Communications HTTP Server Messages Information Disclosure
  Vulnerability (published 2003-02-28):
  http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/6980/

  [2] Technical Note: Enable Telnet Support in the Axis Camera Servers
  http://www.axis.com/techsup/cam_servers/tech_notes/telnet_support.htm
  As stated in this page: "You should enable this option for experimental
  use only. Never leave the Telnet access enabled when having the
  Network Camera installed on a public site."

  [3] Axis' developer site (where a compiler and other development
  tools can be downloaded):
  http://developer.axis.com/


*About Core Security Technologies*

  Core Security Technologies develops strategic security solutions for
  Fortune 1000 corporations, government agencies and military
  organizations. The company offers information security software and
  services designed to assess risk and protect and manage information
  assets.
  Headquartered in Boston, MA, Core Security Technologies can be
  reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at http://www.coresecurity.com.

  To learn more about CORE IMPACT, the first comprehensive penetration
  testing framework, visit:
  http://www.coresecurity.com/products/coreimpact


*DISCLAIMER:*

  The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2003 CORE Security
  Technologies and may be distributed freely provided that no fee is
  charged for this distribution and proper credit is given.

$Id: Axis-advisory.txt,v 1.7 2003/05/23 20:17:29 carlos Exp $

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