bugtraq - Re: b2 cafelog 0.6.1 remote command execution.

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Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0306021054590.665-100000@fincher.cjc.org>
Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2003 10:59:10 -0400 (EDT)
From: Cheng-Jih Chen <cjc@....org>
To: mike little <mike@...1.com>
Subject: Re: b2 cafelog 0.6.1 remote command execution.

On Fri, 30 May 2003, mike little wrote:

> Secondly, has anyone tried this? The fact is that b2config.php defines 
> $b2inc with no test before hand. So that, whilst for the duration of the 
> parsing of b2config.php, $b2inc could indeed be set to some value from 
> the outside world. It is immediately overwritten with no check with the 
> value set by the user (or left from the defalut installation).
> In order to effectively use the setting of b2inc for malicious purposes 
> you would have to have enough access to edit b2config.php.

The problem is that the default location for gm-2-b2.php is in
the b2-tools directory.  The include("b2config.php") statement may
then miss the primary b2 directory and fail to pick up b2config.php.
If register_globals is on, then the attacker can set the b2inc variable
from the URL.