Message-ID: <002b01c35797$18a79560$9708a8c0@MINIME>
Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2003 15:08:14 -0400
From: "Gavin Hanover" <ghanover@...ntipress.com>
To: "mns" <mns@...lab.com>, <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Subject: Re: Another Mac OS X ScreenSaver Security Issue (after Security    Update 2003-07-14)



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I don't quite agree. Windows uses control-alt-delete as a security
device. It binds those keys as a hotkey in such a way that no other
aplication can replace it. This is why it is used at logon; it
prevents a user from creating a program that looked like a logon
prompt, and could bind the control-alt-delete keys to display a
password prompt. (pressing control-alt-delete in any application
other than the logon screen would display the "shutdown/logoff/task
manager" window, at which point you would know not to enter your
password in any prompt)
If someone were to find a way to bind to those hotkeys, would you
then consider this a security issue with Windows? If so, how is
Apple's failure to block kill calls to the screen saver not a
security issue?

Gavin

: I agree with Doug White in the assessment that this is, in fact, an
: issue
: that is the responsibility of Ambrosia, if it is to be considered a
: security
: issue at all. Apple cannot be held responsible for the code of
third 
: party
: developers.
: 
: I downplay the definition of this as a security issue at all
because 
: there are
: so many immediate workarounds. One is not running or installing
Escape 
: Pod
: in the first place. Another is simply logging out when you leave
your 
: workstation,
: rather than relying on ScreenSaverEngine for your security. Bottom
line,
: there are more direct and more threatening exploits that are
available 
: to
: people who happen upon an OS X machine unattended. Allow me to
describe
: a couple of them:
: 
: 1) If a user finds a machine unattended, whether running 
: ScreenSaverEngine
: or not, and regardless of the presence of Escape Pod on said
machine, 
: the
: machine can be booted from an OS X installation CDROM, at which
point 
: the
: "Reset Password" option can be used to change root access to the 
: machine,
: which allows the user to log in as root, then change the password
for 
: any account,
: including whatever account was initially running ScreenSaverEngine.
: Data can
: then be removed or overwritten at said user's discretion.
: 
: 2) If an unattended machine is discovered, it can also be powered 
: down, and
: carried off, physically, without regard to the presence of 
: ScreenSaverEngine
: or Escape Pod.
: 
: Do these constitute security threats or exploits that are Apple's 
: responsibility
: to protect against? Of course not. Both are common sense examples
of 
: how many
: security measures can be circumvented using simple, direct
techniques. 
: Neither
: implies that anyone at Apple should be recoding the operating
system, 
: or any of
: it's underlying core technologies in order to prevent them from
being 
: used.
: 
: Beispiel: If the rightful user/administrator of any given OS X
machine 
: were to install
: the following shell script, how would it be Apple's responsibility
to 
: prevent this?
: 
: #!/bin/sh
: while true
: do
:          killall ScreenSaverEngine
:          sleep 60
: done
: 
: 
: -
: m a t t h e w  n .  s h a r p
: mns(at)mnslab.com

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