| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <20030815095454.GE19569@trusteddebian.org> Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 11:54:54 +0200 From: Peter Busser <peter@...steddebian.org> To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com Subject: Re: Buffer overflow prevention Hi! > > AFAIK all those combined do bring real security against generic exploits. > "Real security" is not the word. Even though PaX is better than W^X, it is far from being perfect. > PaX / Propolice / W^X / non-exec stacks don't solve bugs. What they do is > to _abort_ execution of a process when it behaves abnormally. > So instead of giving attackers the opportunity to run arbitrary code, you > only give them the ability to cause a denial of service. You could say they trade availability for integrity. > This kind of protection should be coupled with tools that automatically > restart daemons when they crash (ex: daemontools and monit) to actually keep > the service running when under attack. Still, all of this is a couple of > unreliable band-aids. A better way to deal with would be to automatically warn someone with enough information to easily find and fix the problem. Restarting the daemon makes the problem managable, but it won't solve the bug. Groetjes, Peter Busser -- The Adamantix Project Taking trustworthy software out of the labs, and into the real world http://www.adamantix.org/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists