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Message-ID: <3F4A4144.3090305@immunix.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Aug 2003 10:03:00 -0700
From: Crispin Cowan <crispin@...unix.com>
To: Eric Greenberg <eric@...frameworks.com>
Cc: 'Bob Rogers' <rogers-bt2@...jr.dyndns.org>,
BUGTRAQ@...URITYFOCUS.COM
Subject: Re: Heterogeneity as a form of obscurity, and its usefulness
Eric Greenberg wrote:
>Heterogeneity has played a major role in disastor and recovery designs for
>as long as I can remember (that would be the past 20 years). Equally so, I
>
Be *very* careful here: security is fundamentally different from fault
tolerance. FT needs to defeat random, independent faults, and
heterogeneity helps. Security needs to defeat an intelligent adversary,
and the adversary can defeat two heterogeneous systems with
approximately twice the effort of defeating a single system. The
defender, in turn, has to spend approximately twice the effort to deploy
dual heterogeneous systems as to deploy a single system.
I argue that it is worse than that, because the effort to defeat two
heterogeneous systems is somewhat *less* than double that of a single
system (because the attacker can exploit common design and
implementation failures) and the effort to deploy & operate dual
heterogeneous systems is somewhat *more* than double that of a single
system (because the defender must account for both consistency and
incompatibility).
Once again, it is not that heterogeneity doesn't work. It's that for the
goal of defending a single resource, it is not as cost-effective as due
diligence & best practices, such as properly employed authentication,
firewalls, and secure operating systems.
Crispin
--
Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. http://immunix.com/~crispin/
Chief Scientist, Immunix http://immunix.com
http://www.immunix.com/shop/
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