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Message-ID: <20030919081351.GA57517@en4.engelschall.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2003 10:13:51 +0200
From: OpenPKG <openpkg@...npkg.org>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: [OpenPKG-SA-2003.041] OpenPKG Security Advisory (sendmail)


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________________________________________________________________________

OpenPKG Security Advisory                            The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html              http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-security@...npkg.org                         openpkg@...npkg.org
OpenPKG-SA-2003.041                                          19-Sep-2003
________________________________________________________________________

Package:             sendmail
Vulnerability:       remote root exploit
OpenPKG Specific:    no

Affected Releases:   Affected Packages:          Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT      <= sendmail-8.12.9-20030801 >= sendmail-8.12.10-20030917
OpenPKG 1.3          <= sendmail-8.12.9-1.3.0    >= sendmail-8.12.9-1.3.1
OpenPKG 1.2          <= sendmail-8.12.7-1.2.3    >= sendmail-8.12.7-1.2.4

Dependent Packages:  none

Description:
  According to a confirmed [1] security advisory from Michal Zalewski
  [2], a remotely exploitable vulnerability exists in all versions
  prior to 8.12.10 of the Sendmail [0] MTA. An error in its prescan()
  function could allow an attacker to write past the end of a buffer,
  corrupting memory structures. Depending on platform and operating
  system architecture, the attacker may be able to execute arbitrary
  code with a specially crafted email message.
  
  The email attack vector is message-oriented as opposed to
  connection-oriented. This means that the vulnerability is triggered
  by the contents of a specially crafted email message rather than by
  lower-level network traffic. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
  (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2003-0694 [3] to the problem.

  Additionally, we have included a fix for a potential buffer overflow
  in Sendmail's ruleset parsing. This problem is not exploitable in the
  default Sendmail configuration; it is exploitable only if non-standard
  rulesets recipient (2), final (4), or mailer-specific envelope
  recipients rulesets are used. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
  (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2003-0681 [4] to this problem.

  Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm
  -q sendmail". If you have the "sendmail" package installed and its
  version is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately
  upgrade it (see Solution) [5][6]

Solution:
  Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
  [7][8], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [9][10] or a mirror
  location, verify its integrity [11], build a corresponding binary
  RPM from it [5] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the
  binary RPM [6]. For the current release OpenPKG 1.3, perform the
  following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for
  other releases adjust accordingly).

  $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
  ftp> bin
  ftp> cd release/1.3/UPD
  ftp> get sendmail-8.12.9-1.3.1.src.rpm
  ftp> bye
  $ <prefix>/bin/rpm -v --checksig sendmail-8.12.9-1.3.1.src.rpm
  $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild sendmail-8.12.9-1.3.1.src.rpm
  $ su -
  # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/sendmail-8.12.9-1.3.1.*.rpm
________________________________________________________________________

References:
  [0]  http://www.sendmail.org/
  [1]  http://www.sendmail.org/8.12.10.html
  [2]  http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/337839/2003-09-16/2003-09-22/0
  [3]  http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0694
  [4]  http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0681
  [5]  http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
  [6]  http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
  [7]  ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/sendmail-8.12.7-1.2.4.src.rpm
  [8]  ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.3/UPD/sendmail-8.12.9-1.3.1.src.rpm
  [9]  ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/
  [10] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.3/UPD/
  [11] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
________________________________________________________________________

For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the
OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@...npkg.org>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the
OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and
hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/
for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory.
________________________________________________________________________

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