Message-ID: <3F9EADB1.9000107@atstake.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2003 12:56:01 -0500
From: "@stake Advisories" <advisories@...take.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Mac OS X Arbitrary File Overwrite via Core Files


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1



                                @stake, Inc.
                              www.atstake.com

                             Security Advisory

Advisory Name: Arbitrary File Overwrite via Core Files
 Release Date: 10/24/2003
  Application: Kernel
     Platform: Mac OS X
     Severity: High
       Author: Dave G. <daveg@...take.com>
Vendor Status: Vendor has new release with fix
CVE Candidate: CAN-2003-0877
    Reference: www.atstake.com/research/advisories/2003/a102803-1.txt


Overview:

In the event a system is running with core files enabled,
attackers with interactive shell access can overwrite arbitrary
files, and read core files created by root owned processes.  This
may result in sensitive information like authentication credentials
being compromised.

      
Details:

Core file creation is disabled by default in Mac OS X.  In the event
that core files are enabled on an Mac OS X system, root owned
processes will write a core file to the /cores directory.  The name
of the core file will be: core.PID(*).  This file will be owned by
root, and is set with 0400 permissions (read only for root, no
privileges for anyone else). 

(*) PID would be the process ID of the process that dumped core

Since the /cores directory is world writable and core file names are
predictable, an attacker with interactive shell access can create
symbolic links in this directory, pointing them to files that exist
elsewhere on the file system.  Through this mechanism, we can
overwrite files by symbolically linking to them.

At this point, an attacker can overwrite any file with the contents
of a core file.  In order to read the core files, one can make a
symbolic link to a file on a mounted DMG image.  Any user can mount
a disk image, allowing them to effectively 'steal' core files.
Depending on what was in the memory of the process that dumped core,
an attacker may be able to find out private information, including
authentication credentials.


Vendor Response:

This is fixed in Mac OS X 10.3.  The core files setting is off by
default on all shipping versions of Mac OS X. For further information
on Mac OS X 10.3, please see http://www.apple.com/macosx/


Recommendation:

1) Upgrade to Panther (Mac OS X 10.3).

2) If upgrading to Panther is not an option, ensure that core file
   creation is disabled.


Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Information:

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned
the following names to these issues.  These are candidates for
inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes
names for security problems.

  CAN-2003-0877 Arbitrary File Overwrite via Core Files


@stake Vulnerability Reporting Policy:
http://www.atstake.com/research/policy/

@stake Advisory Archive:
http://www.atstake.com/research/advisories/

PGP Key:
http://www.atstake.com/research/pgp_key.asc

@stake is currently seeking application security experts to fill
several consulting positions.  Applicants should have strong
application development skills and be able to perform application
security design reviews, code reviews, and application penetration
testing.  Please send resumes to jobs@...take.com.

Copyright 2003 @stake, Inc. All rights reserved.





-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0

iQA/AwUBP56rB0e9kNIfAm4yEQKJ7wCghP3WUFHVqqKG0xH7HB5GsXszzPcAnjTP
G81GJMSVIJ/OqGs1QaowRNne
=DZwD
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Powered by blists - more mailing lists