bugtraq - GLSA: rsync.gentoo.org rotation server compromised (200312-01)

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Message-ID: <1070474017.15117.101.camel@ht.gentoo.org>
Date: Wed, 03 Dec 2003 10:53:37 -0700
From: Daniel Robbins <drobbins@...too.org>
To: gentoo-announce@...too.org, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: GLSA: rsync.gentoo.org rotation server compromised (200312-01)

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GENTOO LINUX SECURITY ANNOUNCEMENT 200312-01
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

GLSA:        200312-01
summary:     rsync.gentoo.org rotation server compromised
severity:    normal
date:        2003-12-02
CVE:         None
exploit:     remote

DESCRIPTION:

On December 2nd at approximately 03:45 UTC, one of the servers that makes up
the rsync.gentoo.org rotation was compromised via a remote exploit.  At this
point, we are still performing forensic analysis.  However, the compromised
system had both an IDS and a file integrity checker installed and we have a
very detailed forensic trail of what happened once the box was breached, so
weare reasonably confident that the portage tree stored on that box
wasunaffected.  

The attacker appears to have installed a rootkit and modified/deleted some
files to cover their tracks, but left the server otherwise untouched. The box
was in a compromised state for approximately one hour before it was
discovered and shut down. During this time, approximately 20 users
synchronized against the portage mirror stored on this box. The method used
to gain access to the box remotely is still under investigation.  We will
release more details once we have ascertained the cause of the remote
exploit.  

This box is not an official Gentoo infrastructure box and is instead donated
by a sponsor. The box provides other services as well and the sponsor has
requested that we not publicly identify the box at this time. Because the
Gentoo part of this box appears to be unaffected by this exploit, we are
currently honoring the sponsor's request.  That said, if at any point, we
determine that any file in the portage tree was modified in any way, we will
release full details about the compromised server.  

SOLUTION:

Again, based on the forensic analysis done so far, we are reasonably
confident that no files within the Portage tree on the box were affected.
However, the server has been removed from all rsync.*.gentoo.org rotations
and will remain so until the forensic analysis has been completed and the box
has been wiped and rebuilt. Thus, users preferring an extra level of security
may ensure that they have a correct and accurate portage tree by running:

emerge sync

Which will perform a sync against another server and ensure that all files
are up to date.

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