bugtraq - Re: Dell BIOS DoS

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Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2003 16:03:54 -0800
From: "Thor" <thor@...merofgod.com>
To: <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Subject: Re: Dell BIOS DoS

>I'll continue the tangent:  Encryption's great against an attacker who
>has physical access to the device holding your data, as long as they
>don't have physical access to the device holding your keys!

This is a bit different than your point, but one thing I've been trying to
find out, so far without any authoritative input, is how much of an
increased risk is it for a laptop that has a PGP disk on it to also have the
private key file accessible.  Most installations default to the private (and
public) key rings being installed in the PGP program file directory.

For a while there, I always used removable media to store my key rings
(diskonkey, memory stick, etc.) as a "just in case" defense, but I've never
really had any confirmation that someone who has access to the encrypted
private key file (but not the passphrase) has a better chance of cracking
the encrypted data.  In fact, the commercial version of PGP Corp's "Mobile
PGP for CE" does not have an option to change the location of the key
rings -- they stay on the handheld device itself, (as opposed to a secure
digital/compact flash card).

Is a weak passphrase more easily exploited with the presense of the key ring
vs direct attack against the encrypted data?  Stuff like that...

Anyone have any insight?

T