bugtraq - Re: SSH vs. IKE trust models (was Re: Insecure IKE Implementations Clarification)

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20031213113304.GA3496@deneb.enyo.de>
Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2003 12:33:04 +0100
From: Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de>
To: Thor Lancelot Simon <tls@....tjls.com>
Cc: aadams@...urityfocus.com, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: SSH vs. IKE trust models (was Re: Insecure IKE Implementations Clarification)

Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:

> That's not true; such attacks have been widely documented at every recent
> IETF meeting.

This may be the case, but keep in mind that the attack is only possible
the first time you log into the server from a specific host.  On my
notebook, all the keys I need have already been stored, that's why I can
use SSH securely even over untrusted networks.

If, at some conference, I used someone else's terminal to log into my
machines, a MITM attack would certainly be possible, but I don't know
much about the integrity of the terminal anyway.

> Nothing prevents you from using certificate-authenticated IKE the exact
> same way you use your web browser: store individual host certificates,
> instead of the root certificate and the DNs of the parties you expect to
> connect to.

For most organizations, it's not an option to roll out tens of thousands
of certificates.  The resulting level of support calls is just
unacceptable.  Passwords are somewhat ri$sky, but users grok that
concept pretty well.  Especially on university networks, you'll have to
face the problem that users want to move their certificates/keys from
one system to another one.  Such tasks are too complicated with current
VPN solutions (which might a feature on corporate networks, but some
networks are different).

> However, nothing *enables* you to use SSH with either a
> hierarchical trust model (which you seem to not like) or a web-of-trust
> model (ala PGP) where you decide whom to trust and how much, because
> both have been proposed to the working group and both have been,
> effectively, shot down.

So what?  You can use patched SSH servers and clients (or proprietary
implementations) to get certificate-based authentication.  There will
never be a world-wide SSH server PKI, no matter what the SSH standards
say.  If you have to patch all your machines to use certificates, this
doesn't make much of a difference.

> As I said, that is very unfortunate, and the dsniff and other attacks
> at recent IETF meetings and elsewhere (e.g. on college campus
> networks) illustrate that real users are suffering for it in the real
> world right now.

For SSL, dsniff already handles the certificate case pretty well.
Unless both terminal and server are in the same PKI.  Unfortunately,
you cannot reuse the web browser PKI for that because the costs are
prohibitive ($200 per SSH server is a hefty price tag).

If this issue bothers you so much, I will write a short Perl script
(based on LWP) that fetches SSH server keys from a given URL and adds
them to ~/.ssh/known_hosts.  This way, you can import trust from the web
browser PKI.