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Date: Thu, 13 May 2004 21:40:10 -0000
From: "http-equiv@...ite.com" <1@...ware.com>
To: <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Cc: <NTBugtraq@...tserv.ntbugtraq.com>
Subject: POA: Outlook Expresss 6.00




Thursday, May 13, 2004

The following is exceptionally unusual. For many years post 
Outlook Express 4 has been an impossibility to target html or 
remote sites directly into the 'window' of an Outlook Express 
mail message. That means all links [your basic href] would 
invoke the browser accompanied by Outlook Express, one Internet 
Explorer, and open content therein.

The following odd-combination 'fluke' returns us to pre-Outlook 
Express 5 days by opening both remote and local content inside 
the actual mail message itself:

[screenshot: http://www.malware.com/poa.png 242KB]

The mail message itself then becomes the browser. Needless to 
say  that the immediate thought turns to the current stream of 
activity ; that being 'phishing'.  There is no browser 
involvement, there is no address bar and any one of previously 
discussed url spoof mechanisms can be deployed to further 
substantiate the ruse:

<BASE href=http://www.malware.com target=_top>
<A href="http://www.microsoft.com">http://www.malware.com</A>

Notes:

1. Interestingly replying to the mail message will fill in the 
href with whatever is stated in the base href
2. about: url protocol functions
3. All content is still processed in the security zone 
applicable to the mail clients settings
4. More technical in-depth possibilities can be examined at a 
future date


End Call

-- 
http://www.malware.com






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