Message-ID: <20040713180302.28039.qmail@www.securityfocus.com>
Date: 13 Jul 2004 18:03:02 -0000
From: Mind Warper <mindwarper@...uxmail.org>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: Two Vulnerabilities in Mozilla may lead to remote compromise


In-Reply-To: <20040713101632.21299.qmail@....securityfocus.com>

Thanks to SecuriTeam for pointing out that the known path vulnerability does not work. Since I got default.nop, it seemed to me as if this is normal, but actually the last 3 letters are random.

The NULL byte bug on the other hand still remains unpatched and working.

Sorry about that.

- Mindwarper


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>From: Mind Warper <mindwarper@...uxmail.org>
>To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
>Subject: Two Vulnerabilities in Mozilla may lead to remote compromise
>
>
>
>Two Vulnerabilities in Mozilla may lead to remote compromise. 
>=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--= 
>
>---------------------- 
>Vendor Information: 
>---------------------- 
>
>Homepage : http://www.mozilla.org 
>Vendor : informed on 11/06/04
>Mailed advisory: 13/06/04 
>Vender Response : None yet 
>
>
>---------------------- 
>Affected Versions: 
>---------------------- 
>
>All version of Mozilla and Firefox
>
>---------------------- 
>Description: 
>---------------------- 
>
>There are two vulnerabilities in Mozilla that may lead to remote code execution under local zone.
>The first vulnerability affects firefox, and may affect mozilla as well. I have only tested
>firefox under windows 2000 and windows XP so I'm not sure if this issue exists on other OS's.
>The problem is that firefox stores its cache in a known directory, and some of the cached html
>is stored in known files. If a victim visits the attackers website which includes malicious javascript
>and then views the content of one of the cache files in local zone, the script will get executed and
>the attacker will be able to compromise the victim's system. This vulnerability in mozilla can't be
>abused as it is, but combined with a few other vulnerabilities the attacker could execute malicious
>code on the victim's computer without having the victim do anything except visit his website (very
>similar to the exploits in Internet Explorer).
>
>The second vulnerability allows the attacker to modify the mime type by using the infamous NULL byte.
>Mozilla by default uses the file extention name to decide how to show a local file. For example,
>if a user requests file:///C:/blah.txt, Mozilla will show the contents of blah.txt, but if the user
>requests file:///C:/blah then Mozilla will pop up a window asking the user if he/she wants to download
>the file. By adding a NULL byte at the end of the filename, and the extention that you want Mozilla
>to handle right after the filename, you can make Mozilla open file:///C:/blah as an html file.
>Just like the vulnerability above, this can't be used alone to execute malicious code, the attacker
>needs to combine the above vulnerability with this one to succeed.
>
>Since the known cache file names have no extention by default on windows, if the attacker uses the NULL
>byte bug, he/she can cause mozilla to show the contents of one of the cache files as an html file,
>and therefore cause mozilla to execute whatever scripts that exist in the cache files.
>
>
>---------------------- 
>Exploit: 
>---------------------- 
>
>The first vulnerability does not require an exploit.
>On windows 2000, there are 3 cache files with known names. They are:
>
>1. C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\default.nop\Cache\_CACHE_001_
>	[ This cache file stores the http headers ]
>
>2. C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\default.nop\Cache\_CACHE_002_
>3. C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\default.nop\Cache\_CACHE_003_
>	[ These 2 cache files store the html data ]
>
>If we combine both vulnerabilities shown above we get something like this:
>
>file://C:\\Documents and Settings\\Administrator\\Application Data\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\default.nop\\Cache\\_CACHE_002_%00.html
>
>Mozilla will open this file without the %00.html, but it will treat it as an html file and won't pop up a download window.
>
>
>---------------------- 
>Solution: 
>---------------------- 
>
>Visit mozilla.org to check for updates.
>
>---------------------- 
>Contact: 
>---------------------- 
>
>- Mindwarper 
>- mindwarper@...ecurity.com 
>- http://mlsecurity.com 
>

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