lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20040728155214.15873.qmail@www.securityfocus.com>
Date: 28 Jul 2004 15:52:14 -0000
From: Ofer Elzam <ofere@...mail.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Aladdin response regarding eSafe


In-Reply-To: <18610004519.20040724152743@...URITY.NNOV.RU>

eSafe Gateway uses a default value of 80% file download before first inspection of executable files from HTTP servers. This value can be changed to as low as 5% if desired.
We feel that the 80% gives a good balance between user experience and security needs. Customers would usually want to see a fast moving download progress bar.  If we set the value to 5% - the progress bar will move just a little bit (5%) when downloading and the remaining 95% very fast as eSafe finishes the inspection.  This annoys users.

The customer has a choice - better security or better user experience (let's also remember that currently there are no real viruses in the wild that have used such methods).
Testing this technique with EICAR is very specific as EICAR is not like typical real viruses; it is only a few bytes in length.

In any case, if a future virus that can cause damage even when only a few bytes are downloaded is discovered, eSafe has the right technology to identify and block it. We can even automatically change customer configuration to do so if needed.

eSafe is known for innovative security features so this subject will be further investigated in search of even more security enhancements.

Regards,
Ofer Elzam, CISSP
eSafe Product Manager






Dear Hugo van der Kooij,

--Friday, July 23, 2004, 10:21:22 PM, you wrote to bugtraq securityfocus com:

HvdK> Both as NitroEngine or CVP server they will push as much of 80% to the
HvdK> end-user before they stop a virus. Then they rely on the adding of the
HvdK> exact URL so that URL can be blocked in all next requests.

It depends on how antiviral check is actually implemented. If connection
is  broken  immediately after signature is detected - there is no way to
download  infected  file,  because signature will not pass to client and
client  will  not  be  able  to  use "Range:" header to resume partially
downloaded  file.

If  antiviral  filter  checks data _after_ all data received from client
with  20%  buffering  yes,  it's possible to bypass this check for HTTP,
because  there  is  no  way  (at least for HTTP/1.0 and FTP) to indicate
error to client and make him to delete partially downloaded data.

You can check it, by sending EICAR with some additional data: if you can
find  EICAR  signature  on  the  client  after  connection  is broken by
antiviral filter you can bypass it's protection.


-- 
~/ZARAZA
Машина оказалась способной к единственному действию,
а именно умножению 2x2, да и то при этом ошибаясь. (Лем)




Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ