bugtraq - Re: Clear text password exposure in Datakey's tokens and smartcards

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Message-ID: <41123007.8080805@mitel.com>
Date: Thu, 05 Aug 2004 09:03:03 -0400
From: Lee Dilkie <lee_dilkie@...el.com>
To: Toomas Soome <Toomas.Soome@...rolink.ee>
Cc: lionel.ferette@...net.be, vuln@...view.com,
   full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: Clear text password exposure in Datakey's tokens
 and smartcards


Toomas Soome wrote:

> Lionel Ferette wrote:
>
>> Note that this is true for almost all card readers on the market, not 
>> only for Datakey's. Having worked for companies using crypto smart 
>> cards, I have conducted a few risk analysis about that. The 
>> conclusion has always been that if the PIN must be entered from a PC, 
>> and the attacker has means to install software on the system (through 
>> directed viruses, social engineering, etc), the game's over.
>>
>> The only solution against that problem is to have the PIN entered 
>> using a keypad on the reader. Only then does the cost of an attack 
>> raise significantly. But that is opening another can of worms, 
>> because there is (was?) no standard for card readers with attached 
>> pin pad (at the time, PC/SCv2 wasn't finalised - is it?).
>>
>
> at least some cards are supporting des passphrases to implement 
> secured communication channels but I suppose this feature is not that 
> widely in use....  how many card owners are prepared to remember both 
> PIN codes and passphrases...
>
> toomas

Perhaps I'm missing something here. As far as I can tell, no keys 
located on the card were compromised, only the PIN was. Since this is a 
two factor authentication system, possession of the PIN is of little 
value without possession of the token itself.

Am I missing the point here?

regards,

-lee

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