bugtraq - OpenOffice World-Readable Temporary Files Disclose Files to Local Users

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Message-ID: <20040910152759.7739.qmail@www.securityfocus.com>
Date: 10 Sep 2004 15:27:59 -0000
From: "Jérôme" ATHIAS <jerome.athias@...amail.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: OpenOffice World-Readable Temporary Files Disclose Files to Local
    Users

OpenOffice World-Readable Temporary Files Disclose Files to Local Users

Date:  Thu, 9 Sep 2004 23:52:18 -0400
Subject:  http://www.openoffice.org/issues/show_bug.cgi?id=33357

Reporter: pmladek
OS:  Linux
Version:  OOo 1.1.2
Summary:  Insecure permissions on temporary files at runtime

When OOo is started, a directory /tmp/sv<RAND>.tmp is created, where
RAND is a 3 character random string. 

The permissions of this directory allow other users (depending on the user's
umask) to 'cd' to this directory and list the contents.

Once a file is saved, a zipped file is created in /tmp/sv<RAND>.tmp and the
name of the file follows the same convention. The permissions of the file
allow others (depending on the user's umask) to read the content.

Due to this any user can grab sensitive information of someother user.

Steps to reproduce the problem:
1. Launch OpenOffice.
2. List /tmp contents. Locate the directory 'sv*.tmp'
3. Type in some contents in the document and save it.
4. List the contents of the directory /tmp/sv*.tmp/
5. Do not close OpenOffice. 'su' to a different user.
6. Copy the file under /tmp/sv*.tmp/ to home directory.
7. Use 'unzip' to unzip the files.
8. The file content.xml holds the data the user had just saved.

The workaround is to set more secure umask. The problem is that the users does
not know about it. Why should they need to set more strict umask if they save
its data in a directory which has the correct permissions. They do not expect
that there are any world-readable temporary data available somewhere on the system.

Also reported here http://securitytracker.com/id?1011205 

Regards,
Jérôme ATHIAS