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Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.58.0409281859560.25643@guildenstern.oneview.local>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2004 19:23:50 -0500 (EST)
From: "Jason T. Miller" <jasomill@...ffstall.com>
To: gandalf@...ital.net
Cc: DavidB@...l.interclean.com, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: RE: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account
    Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes


On Tue, 28 Sep 2004 gandalf@...ital.net wrote:

> Let me add one more social dynamic.  The public will want to see
> instantaneous vote results,

I hear this voiced often in the debate, and that it's one of the big
benefits of DRE systems, i.e., faster results, though I've never seen any
evidence to support the claim that voters are particularly unhappy with
the speed of election returns using current technology (the Florida
recount aside, but that's an exceptional event), or, more importantly,
that "the public" (or, less ambiguously, a majority of voters in this
country) is willing to sacrifice accuracy for speed in elections. Of
course, "all things being equal", it's probably safe to say that "the
public wants faster results", much as it's safe to presume that the masses
would rather be rich and healthy than poor and sick, but that's not really
saying much, as all things are never equal, and, in a world of finite
resources, priorities have to be set.

This member of "the public", for one, doesn't really care if election
results take a day or a week, so long as they're as accurate as available
technologies and resources permit.

On another note, I'm curious what's being done on the paper-trail systems
to prevent vote buying -- seems like I could snap a picture of the receipt
before I leave (with a camera phone, say) and use it as evidence that I've
voted for someone. Sure, such a thing could be Photoshopped, but doing so
untraceably is beyond the skill of most voters, so that isn't much of a
risk for a prospective buyer. Can I say "no" to the verification and vote
again, without leaving the booth or otherwise drawing undue attention to
my actions?

Sincerely,
Jason T. Miller
Shaffstall Engineering

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shaffstall Corporation     http://shaffstall.com / http://theoneview.com
A Division of One View, Inc.                     jasomill@...ffstall.com
8531 Bash Street / Indianapolis, IN / 46250            317-842-2077 x302


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