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Message-ID: <A4B45531F8B3A04FB8FF279A9BA533390C17AAD9@lnxdayexch07b.lexis-nexis.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2004 11:22:15 -0400
From: "Reed, Phillip C. (LNG-DAY)" <phillip.reed@...isnexis.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: RE: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor    
	Account    Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes


Well there you go. Money is evidently more important than votes.

> -----Original Message-----
> 
> Why can't this all be done the same way Nevada handles modern 
> slot machines? 
> For example if you are playing a slot in Nevada and feel it's 
> not behaving 
> there is a 24 hour toll free number you can call and the 
> Nevada Gaming 
> Commission and they will send someone out to tear the machine 
> apart and 
> verify (among other things) that the software image in the machine 
> corresponds to an approved one that is on file with the Nevada Gaming 
> Commission. Slot machines undergo a torture test that 
> involves 20,000 volt 
> tasers to the outer case, lights (to try and confuse the pay 
> out mechanism) 
> and so on. The source code is reviewed and approved, kept on 
> file with 
> approved binary images, etc.
> 
> Seriously folks, if it can be done right for a nickel slot 
> machine you think 
> it could be done right for an electronic voting machine.
> 
> 
> 

			...phil


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