bugtraq - Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes

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Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.58.0409281547370.1272@shishi.roaringpenguin.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2004 15:50:12 -0400 (EDT)
From: "David F. Skoll" <dfs@...ringpenguin.com>
To: Marco S Hyman <marc@...fu.org>
Cc: "Greg A. Woods" <woods@...rd.com>,
	Jeremy Epstein <jeremy.epstein@...methods.com>,
	"BUGTRAQ: Full Disclosure Security Mailing List" <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Subject: Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account
 Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes

On Mon, 27 Sep 2004, Marco S Hyman wrote:

>  > The answer is not to try to show that open source can be used in
>  > captialistic ventures, but rather to be very clear in stating that free
>  > enterprise (and capitalism) has no place whatsoever at any time in the
>  > creation, formation, and instatement of a government for the people.

> Do expect to return to the age where voting is done with a pen and a
> blank slip of paper,

Yes, indeed.  Works very well where I live (the paper isn't blank, though;
it's a pre-printed ballot.)

> both supplied by the voter?

That's not necessary.  I trust the ballot and pen given to me by
Elections Canada.

> All I demand from a voting system is that votes can be voter verified.

I demand that it can be voter-verified by any "average" voter.  That means
that anyone capable of voting must be capable of fully understanding and
verifying the voting system, which pretty much eliminates electronic
voting machines.

> That's not true of ANY voting machine regardless of who writes the code
> unless there is a hard copy audit trail.   If there is a hard copy audit
> trail then it doesn't make any difference who wrote the code.

If you already have a hard copy audit trail, then why not *just* use the
hard-copy and dispense with electonic voting machines altogether?

--
David.