Message-ID: <41E2FDC1.1030401@appsecinc.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2005 17:12:17 -0500
From: "Team SHATTER (Application Security, Inc.)" <vrathod@...secinc.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com,
	vulnwatch@...nwatch.org, ntbugtraq@...tserv.ntbugtraq.com
Subject: [AppSecInc Team SHATTER Security Advisory] Microsoft Windows Improper
 Token Validation


Microsoft Windows Improper Token Validation

AppSecInc Team SHATTER Security Advisory
http://www.appsecinc.com/resources/alerts/general/06-0001.html
January 10, 2005

Credit: This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Cesar 
Cerrudo of Application Security, Inc.

Risk Level: High

Summary:
A local privilege elevation vulnerability exists on the Windows 
operating systems. This vulnerability allows any user to take complete 
control over the system and affects Windows 2000, Windows XP, and 
Windows 2003 (all service packs).

Versions Affected:
Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows 2003 (all service packs).

Details:
According to MSDN:

"An access token is an object that describes the security context of a 
process or thread. The information in a token includes the identity and 
privileges of the user account associated with the process or thread. 
When a user logs on, the system verifies the user's password by 
comparing it with information stored in a security database. If the 
password is authenticated, the system produces an access token. Every 
process executed on behalf of this user has a copy of this access token.

The system uses an access token to identify the user when a thread 
interacts with a securable object or tries to perform a system task that 
requires privileges. Access tokens contain the following information:

- The security identifier (SID) for the user's account
- SIDs for the groups of which the user is a member
- A logon SID that identifies the current logon session
- A list of the privileges held by either the user or the user's groups
- An owner SID
- The SID for the primary group
- The default DACL that the system uses when the user creates a 
securable object without specifying a security descriptor
- The source of the access token
- Whether the token is a primary or impersonation token
- An optional list of restricting SIDs
- Current impersonation levels
- Other statistics

Every process has a primary token that describes the security context of 
the user account associated with the process. By default, the system 
uses the primary token when a thread of the process interacts with a 
securable object. Moreover, a thread can impersonate a client account. 
Impersonation allows the thread to interact with securable objects using 
the client's security context. A thread that is impersonating a client 
has both a primary token and an impersonation token."

Microsoft introduced a new user right called "Impersonate a client after 
authentication" in Windows 2000 SP4, Windows 2003, and Windows XP SP2. 
This right allows or limits the processes ran by a user from being able 
to impersonate. For instance, if a process thread running in the 
security context of a user without proper rights tries to impersonate, 
then it gets an Identity Token instead of an Impersonation Token. An 
Identity Token only identifies the user account under which the target 
process is running and can not be used for impersonation. An Identity 
Token can also be retrieved by a thread in order to identify the user 
account under which a process is running. Under certain circumstances 
this Identity Token can be used to impersonate any process thread 
running under any user account.

The attack vector identified is to impersonate a victim using Identity 
Tokens to access network shares using UNC. For instance, after a thread 
gets an Identity Token for the Local System account or an administrative 
account, the token can be used to impersonate and access administrative 
shares such as \\computername\c$ and to replace system files such as 
.exe, .dll, etc... This allows an attacker to elevate privileges or to 
read arbitrary files bypassing permissions. Also, network shares on 
other computers can be accessed in the same way. For instance, user 
JohnDoe's Identity Token can access \\remotepc\someshare\ for which the 
user JohnDoe has permissions but the attacker does not. The attack 
succeeds because apparently that user's credentials are cached by the 
LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) after successfully 
authenticating to a network share by standard methods. Then when the 
share is accessed again, the LSASS assumes an Identity Token is an 
Impersonation token and uses the cached credentials to authenticate.

This vulnerability is critical for servers using Terminal Services (or 
Citrix) because a user could impersonate any other user to access 
network shares.

Links:

http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/secauthz/security/client_impersonation.asp
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/secauthz/security/access_tokens.asp
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/821546/en-us
http://www.microsoft.com/resources/documentation/WindowsServ/2003/standard/proddocs/en-us/Default.asp?url=/resources/documentation/WindowsServ/2003/standard/proddocs/en-us/647.asp

Workaround:
None.

Fix:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS04-044.mspx

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Application Security, Inc.
www.appsecinc.com
 
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organizations to more confidently extend their business with
customers, partners and suppliers. Our security experts, combined
with our strong support team, deliver up-to-date application
safeguards that minimize risk and eliminate its impact on business. 
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