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Message-ID: <41E57B45.50306@comcast.net>
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2005 14:32:21 -0500
From: John Richard Moser <nigelenki@...cast.net>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Is DEP easily evadable?
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I'm no security expert, so bear with me here; I just kind of tripped
over something interesting that I'd like to ask about.
I was blogging about DEP based on MS' technical documentation and came
up with a quick and dirty way to use a buffer overflow (we'll assume no
stackguarding, or that you found a way around it i.e. using a format
string bug) to kick DEP out of the way. This is pretty much based on
the PaX documentation and justification for mprotect() restrictions.
In a normal shellcode attack, you have a simple process involving:
- - Overwrite the return address
- - Spew in some executable code
- - Let RET take PC to that code and hand you control of the program
With executable protections preventing the stack from being executable,
such as with DEP, a different process (hopefully) occurs:
- - Overwrite the return address
- - Spew in some executable code
- - Segmentation fault (memory not executable)
- - Program exits, attack fails
I looked at the fact that Virtual*() functions (similar to mprotect() on
POSIX systems) can be used to make any area of memory executable. So,
here's my way:
- - Overwrite the return address
- - Overwrite the stack frame pointer
- - Spew in a stack frame with a return pointer to the code you injected
- - Spew in some executable code
- - Return to a Virtual*() function (don't know nor care which, I'm not
doing the attack)
- - Mark the code you injected executable
- - Let RET take PC to the code you injected. You win.
Without mprotect() restrictions OR ASLR, this should be trivial to do,
right?
I can't comment on SafeSEH, although I don't see screwing with exception
handlers as being more interesting to a cracker than injecting your own
code.
- --
All content of all messages exchanged herein are left in the
Public Domain, unless otherwise explicitly stated.
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