bugtraq - Re: Is DEP easily evadable?

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <41E6C09B.2050101@comcast.net>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 13:40:27 -0500
From: John Richard Moser <nigelenki@...cast.net>
To: Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de>
Cc: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: Is DEP easily evadable?

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Florian Weimer wrote:
> * John Richard Moser:
> 
> 
>>I'm no security expert, so bear with me here; I just kind of tripped
>>over something interesting that I'd like to ask about.
>>
>>I was blogging about DEP based on MS' technical documentation and came
>>up with a quick and dirty way to use a buffer overflow (we'll assume no
>>stackguarding, or that you found a way around it i.e. using a format
>>string bug) to kick DEP out of the way.  This is pretty much based on
>>the PaX documentation and justification for mprotect() restrictions.
> 
> 
> Look for return-into-libc exploits.  There are quite a few.
> 
> Even with non-executable stack and heap, no one guarantees that buffer
> overflows aren't exploitable.  Randomization of load addresses is
> intended to provide additional protection, but the number of available
> bits is fairly low on 32 bit machines (problably less than 16).  I
> don't know if Windows is doing it.
> 

I don't see anything in the docs about it, but I don't have XP (I think
I have an XP license. . . yeah here it is, taped to the bottom of my
laptop; but I don't have a CD, and don't feel like finding . . what are
those things. . . a torrent of it)

PaX does pretty nice randomization.  I think 15/16 for heap and stack
and 24 for mmap(), though I could be overshooting the 24.  I'm on amd64
so I can't just run paxtest and see; though I could read the source code.

Also, there appears to be a UUDecode() function available! :)  Looks
like you might be able to do attacks with NULLs in the shellcode and such?

Oh well, I guess this is just redundant white noise then; I was just
struck dumb a bit when it appeared that HW-DEP provided nothing in the
way of real protection; I'm too used to security enhancements being real.

- --
All content of all messages exchanged herein are left in the
Public Domain, unless otherwise explicitly stated.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.0 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org

iD8DBQFB5sCYhDd4aOud5P8RAn+VAKCKTEfka1sMzEdL9xliKEDJDsGxEgCgkFI4
ph+fJOcB0ELonMpX/Px2RxY=
=Mctm
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----