lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <200503301600.vpn3k__24585.1071471863$1112200745$gmane$org@psirt.cisco.com> Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2005 16:00:00 -0000 From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team <psirt@...co.com> To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com Cc: psirt@...co.com Subject: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco VPN 3000 Concentrator Vulnerable to Crafted SSL Attack -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ================================================================= Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco VPN 3000 Concentrator Vulnerable to Crafted SSL attack ================================================================= Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2005 March 30 1600 UTC (GMT) +------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Please provide your feedback on this document. +------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Contents ======== Summary Affected Products Details Impact Software Versions and Fixes Workarounds Exploitation and Public Announcements Status of This Notice: FINAL Distribution Revision History Cisco Security Procedures +------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Summary ======= The Cisco VPN 3000 series concentrators are a family of purpose-built, remote access Virtual Private Network (VPN) platforms for data encryption and authentication. A malicious user may be able to send a crafted attack via SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) to the concentrators which may cause the device to reload, and/or drop user connections. Repeated exploitation will create a sustained DoS (denial of service). Workarounds are available to mitigate this vulnerability. Cisco has made free software available to address this vulnerability for all affected customers. This vulnerability is documented in the Cisco Bug Toolkit as Bug ID CSCeg11424 ( registered customers only) This advisory is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050330-vpn3k.shtml Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products +------------------ Cisco VPN 3000 series concentrators running software 4.1.7.A and earlier are affected by this vulnerability. This series includes models 3005, 3015, 3020, 3030, 3060, 3080 and the Cisco VPN 3002 Hardware Client. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- The following products are confirmed not vulnerable: * Cisco IPSec VPN Services Module (VPNSM) * Cisco VPN 5000 Concentrators * Cisco PIX Firewalls * Any Cisco device that runs Cisco's Internetwork Operating System (IOS) * Any Cisco device that runs Cisco's Catalyst Operating System (CatOS) No other Cisco products are currently known to contain this vulnerability. Details ======= Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is a protocol used to encrypt the data transferred over a TCP session. SSL in Cisco products is mainly used by the HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) web service for which the default TCP port is 443. Due to this vulnerability, a malicious user may send crafted HTTPS packets which may result in a reload of the affected device or and/or user connections being dropped. The affected products are only vulnerable if they have the HTTPS service enabled and the access to the service is not limited to trusted hosts or network management workstations. By default, HTTPS is not enabled on VPN 3000 devices, and must be manually enabled. Affected devices are not vulnerable to transit traffic, only traffic that is destined to them may exploit this vulnerability. To check if the HTTPS service is enabled, one can do the following: 1. Check the configuration on the device to verify the status of the HTTPS service. 2. Try to connect to the device using a standard web browser that supports SSL using a URL similar to https://ip_address_of_device/. No authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability. This vulnerability is documented in the Cisco Bug Toolkit as Bug ID CSCeg11424 ( registered customers only) Impact ====== Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may result in a reload of the affected device or and/or user connections being dropped. Repeated exploitation of this vulnerability could result in a sustained Denial of Service. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== Cisco VPN 3000 series users can upgrade to version 4.1.7.B or later software to resolve this vulnerability. When considering software upgrades, please also consult http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/advisory.html and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ( TAC ) for assistance. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/. Customers using Third-party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for assistance with the upgrade, which should be free of charge. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@...co.com Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Please do not contact either "psirt@...co.com" or "security-alert@...co.com" for software upgrades. See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Workarounds =========== Disable HTTPS +------------ Disabling HTTPS will effectively mitigate this vulnerability, provided the concentrator is used only for IPSEC, PPTP or L2TP over IPsec VPN connections. If the concentrator is configured for WebVPN connectivity, disabling HTTPS will also render WebVPN inoperable. For details on how to disable HTTPS, please reference www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2284/ products_configuration_guide_chapter09186a00803ee1e4.html#wp1309633. Transit ACLs +----------- SSL to the VPN3000 could be blocked as part of a Transit ACL on screening routers, switches and firewalls controlling all access to the trusted network. Transit ACLs are considered a network security best practice and should be considered as a long-term addition to good network security, as well as a workaround for this specific vulnerability. The white paper entitled "Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge" presents guidelines and recommended deployment techniques for transit ACLs: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/tacl.html. The effectiveness of any workaround is dependent on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. This vulnerability was discovered during internal Cisco security review. Status of This Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS ADVISORY IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE ADVISORY OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE ADVISORY IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS NOTICE AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security advisory that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory will be posted on Cisco's worldwide website at http://cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050330-vpn3k.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@...co.com * first-teams@...st.org (includes CERT/CC) * bugtraq@...urityfocus.com * vulnwatch@...nwatch.org * cisco@...t.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@...k.nether.net * full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@...sgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------------+ | Revision | 2005-March-30 | Initial | | 1.0 | | Release. | +---------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html . This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. +--------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 8.1 iQA/AwUBQkq5y3sxqM8ytrWQEQLePQCg07Fk4S6PzWb9Y2tV+S6WYqbDx4MAn0MN LhCf2gYiv+4TuDyV9BIj5BgP =hDeT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Powered by blists - more mailing lists