Message-ID: <428A3106.40800@gulftech.org>
Date: Tue, 17 May 2005 12:59:34 -0500
From: GulfTech Security Research <security@...ftech.org>
To: BugTraq <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>,
	Secunia Research <vuln@...unia.com>, OSVDB <moderators@...db.org>
Subject: Help Center Live Vulnerabilities


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# GulfTech Security Research May 17th, 2005
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# Vendor : Michael Bird
# URL : http://www.helpcenterlive.com/
# Version : Help Center Live [ All Versions ]
# Risk : Multiple Vulnerabilities
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Description:
Help Center Live is a `Live` help desk system written in PHP using
a MySql database backend that features Live Support, Trouble Tickets
and FAQ within one project. This is a very popular application,
especially with webhosts and other services. Unfortunately Help Center
Live is vulnerable to Sql injection, Script Injection, and Cross Site
Scripting attacks, but the most serious of the vulnerabilities mentioned
(The SQL Injection attacks) require magic_quotes_gpc to be set to off.



Cross Site Scripting:
Cross site scripting exists in Help Center Live. This vulnerability
exists due to user supplied input not being checked properly. Below
is an example.

http://path/faq/index.php?find=blah[CODEGOESHERE]&search=Search

This vulnerability could be used to steal cookie based authentication
credentials within the scope of the current domain, or render hostile
code in a victim's browser. This is the same vulnerability I had reported
in my previous Help Center Live advisory, but it seems that the issue
was never resolved properly.



Script Injection:
There are several script injection vulnerabilities in Help Center Live
that allows an attacker to force a logged in operator to run malicious
code in their browser. This can be accomplished by an attacker by entering
malicious code into the name or message fields when requesting a chat, or by
entering malicious script into the body of a message when opening a trouble
ticket. Also, an attacker can use this to retrieve the md5 password of the
operator (the md5 password is stored in the cookie), or can use this issue
combined with the soon to be mentioned CSRF issue and force an admin to
unknowingly or knowingly execute arbitrary commands.



Cross Site Request Forgeries:
Help Center Live uses the GET method for some admin actions, and the only
check is if the admin is logged in. This makes it easy for an attacker to
trick a logged in admin to perform arbitrary requests.

http://www.example.com/support/cp/tt/view.php?attach=y&tid=2
http://www.example.com/support/cp/tt/view.php?tid=2&delete=1

The above url's will (a) cause an operator to allow attachments for a 
trouble
ticket that is opened with the id of two (b) cause an operator to delete an
attachment. There may be more instances of CSRF in Help Center Live, but I
will leave that for someone else to mess with :) For more information on
CSRF visit the following url: http://www.tux.org/~peterw/csrf.txt



SQL Injection:
There are a number of SQL Injection vulnerabilities in Help Center Live, as
little/no sanitation is made on incoming variables passed to the SQL Query.
In my opinion the only reason these issues have not been found already is
because (a) everything is encapsulated in single quotes, so if magic quotes
gpc is on then we cannot exploit the issues (b) Every single SQL Injection
issue I am about to talk about is a somewhat blind SQL Injection issue. 
First
we have a couple "run of the mill" SQL Injection issues in tt/view.php and
faq/index.php respectively. I will not spend a lot of time on the technical
details of these issues because they are nothing we have not seen a million
times. Here is some vulnerable code snip though to give an understanding.

$TICKET_tid = $_GET["tid"];
$result = DATABASE_query("SELECT * FROM ".$DB_prefix."tickets WHERE
id='$TICKET_tid' AND username='$TICKETS_username'");
if ($get = DATABASE_fetch($result)) {

As we can see from the above code $TICKET_tid is never sanitized and taken
directly from the user supplied $_GET. We cannot exploit this issue, or any
other issue in this advisory because the data is encapsulated in single 
quotes,
and magic_quotes_gpc will not allow us to break the query. Below are example
requests that will allow for us to grab an operators username and 
password hash
by exploiting the above code, and also very similar code in /faq/index.php

http://www.example.com/support/faq/index.php?x=f&id=-99'%20UNION%20SELECT%200,
0,operator,password%20FROM%20hcl_operators%20WHERE%201/*

http://www.example.com/support/tt/view.php?tid=-99'%20UNION%20SELECT%200,0,0,
operator,password,0,0,0,0,0%20FROM%20hcl_operators%20WHERE%201/*

There are also a few more SQL Injection vulnerabilities in Help Center Live
that are a bit more interesting, and these issues lie in 
lh/chat_download.php,
lh/icon.php, and tt/download.php. I find these particular examples a bit 
more
interesting because they are download scripts, and successful 
exploitation leads
to things like the downloaded file having the desired password hash, the 
content
type in the headers displaying the hash, or having a base64_decoded 
version of
the hash that may look something like this (‡.íÞ÷á¯=Ùî7}ÿ7Ý×uõíÛkN¹) 
but can be
base64 encoded into the md5 hash.

http://www.example.com/support/tt/download.php?fid=-99'%20UNION%20SELECT%200,0,0,
password,0,operator,0,0%20FROM%20hcl_operators%20WHERE%20id='1

http://www.example.com/support/lh/icon.php?status=-99' UNION SELECT 
password,
password FROM hcl_operators WHERE id=1/*

http://www.example.com/support/lh/chat_download.php?fid=-99' UNION 
SELECT password,
operator,password FROM hcl_operators WHERE id=1/*

Again, exploitation of these issues requires magic_quotes_gpc set to off
on the server hosting the Help Center Live installation.



Solution:
The developer has made a patch available some time ago.



Related Info:
The original advisory can be found at the following location
http://www.gulftech.org/?node=research&article_id=00076-05172005



Credits:
James Bercegay of the GulfTech Security Research Team

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