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Message-ID: <FB24803D1DF2A34FA59FC157B77C970504422B71@IDSERV04.idef.com>
Date: Tue, 24 May 2005 16:09:23 -0400
From: "iDEFENSE Labs" <labs-no-reply@...fense.com>
To: <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>, <vulnwatch@...nwatch.org>,
<full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: iDEFENSE Security Advisory 05.24.05: Ipswitch
IMail Web Calendaring Arbitrary File Read Vulnerability
Ipswitch IMail Web Calendaring Arbitrary File Read Vulnerability
iDEFENSE Security Advisory 05.24.05
www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=242&type=vulnerabilities
May 24, 2005
I. BACKGROUND
Ipswitch Collaboration Suite (ICS) is a comprehensive communication and
collaboration solution for Microsoft Windows with a customer base of
over 53 million users. More information is available on the vendor's
website:
http://www.ipswitch.com/products/IMail_Server/index.html
II. DESCRIPTION
Remote exploitation of a directory traversal vulnerability in Ipswitch
Inc.'s Imail Web Calendaring server allows attackers to read arbitrary
files with System privileges.
The problem specifically exists because of a flaw in the handling of
requests for nonexistent javascript (jsp) files. By requesting a
nonexistent jsp file followed by a question mark, several sequences of
"..\" and then the path to a file on the system, an attacker can read
arbitrary files remotely without any authentication.
The following query demonstrates how the system's boot.ini file may be
retrieved:
GET /bla.jsp?\..\..\..\..\..\..\..\..\..\..\boot.ini HTTP/1.0
Connection: Close
Host: example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.01; Windows NT 5.0)
Pragma: no-cache
III. ANALYSIS
Successful exploitation allows remote attackers to retrieve arbitrary
files from the target host. Exploitation does not require authentication
and does not require exploit code, as a user can simply type the
malicious query in a web browser.
IV. DETECTION
iDEFENSE has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in the latest
version of Ipswitch IMAIL, version 8.13. It is suspected that earlier
versions are also vulnerable.
V. WORKAROUND
Limit access to the Web Calandaring server by allowing only trusted
hosts to access TCP port 8484, the default port for Web Calandaring. If
the Web Calandaring service is not required, disable it entirely.
VI. VENDOR RESPONSE
The vendor has released the following patch to fix this vulnerability:
ftp://ftp.ipswitch.com/Ipswitch/Product_Support/IMail/imail82hf2.exe
The associated vendor advisory can be found at:
http://www.ipswitch.com/support/imail/releases/imail_professional/im82hf
2.html
VII. CVE INFORMATION
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CAN-2005-1252 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes names for
security problems.
VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE
04/25/2005 Initial vendor notification
05/10/2005 Initial vendor response
05/24/2005 Public disclosure
IX. CREDIT
The discoverer of this vulnerability wishes to remain anonymous.
Get paid for vulnerability research
http://www.idefense.com/poi/teams/vcp.jsp
Free tools, research and upcoming events
http://labs.idefense.com
X. LEGAL NOTICES
Copyright (c) 2005 iDEFENSE, Inc.
Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDEFENSE. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically, please
email customerservice@...fense.com for permission.
Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect,
or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on,
this information.
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