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Date: Tue, 31 May 2005 10:22:54 +0100
From: Roy Hills <Roy.Hills@...-monitor.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Nortel VPN Router Malformed Packet DoS Vulnerability


Nortel VPN Router Malformed Packet DoS Vulnerability

Summary:

NTA Monitor have discovered a denial of service (DoS) vulnerability in the 
Nortel VPN Router products (which were previously known as Nortel 
Contivity) while performing a VPN security test for a customer.

We believe that this is a serious vulnerability, because a single malformed 
IKE packet causes the VPN router to crash.  Also it is not normally 
possible to prevent the malformed packet from reaching the router.

Vulnerability Details:

The vulnerability is triggered by sending a single IPsec IKE packet with a 
malformed ISAKMP header.  On receipt of this malformed packet, the VPN 
router will crash immediately.  The crash occurs every time such a 
malformed packet is sent.

Sometimes the affected VPN router will automatically reboot (which takes 
about five minutes), but sometimes it will stay down indefinitely and 
require manual intervention to restart it.  In tests, the VPN router 
automatically rebooted around 80% of the time, and needed to be manually 
reset on the remaining 20%.

The VPN router does not log the malformed packet, even if the logging level 
is turned up to maximum.  This is probably because the packet causes the 
router to crash before it has a chance to log it.

It is not normally possible to block public inbound access to the IKE 
service on the VPN router, because it is required for remote access IPsec 
operation.  As IKE uses the UDP transport protocol, the attacker may forge 
the packet's source IP address to avoid identification, or to prevent the 
victim from blocking the traffic with ingress filtering.  In addition, 
current IDS/IPS systems will probably not be able to detect the attack, 
because the malformed packet looks very similar to a normal IKE packet.

It is possible for attackers to detect and fingerprint Nortel VPN routers 
using the IKE fingerprinting techniques that we have previously published 
in VPN security white papers.  Therefore users should not assume that their 
VPN router is invisible just because it's not published in the DNS and is 
not running any TCP services.

We are not planning to release the precise details of the malformed packet, 
or the proof-of-concept exploit code due to the danger of an exploit being 
released before the majority of the Nortel VPN users have upgraded to the 
fixed version.

Affected Versions:

The issues affects Nortel VPN router models 1010, 1050, 1100, 600, 1600, 
1700, 2600, 2700, 4500, 4600 and 5000.  We believe that all current 
software versions on the affected models are vulnerable.

Solution:

Upgrade to software version V5.05_200 or later.  Nortel customers with a 
valid login may obtain the new software from the Nortel technical support 
website:

http://www130.nortelnetworks.com/cgi-bin/eserv/cs/main.jsp

Patches for earlier software releases 4.76, 4.85, 4.90 and 5.00 are 
expected to be available within a few weeks.

Timeline:

The vulnerability was first discovered on 3rd March 2005, and was 
immediately reported to the customer and Nortel Networks security 
team.  Nortel reproduced the issue, and developed a fix.  The fixed version 
for the latest software was released on 27th May 2005.

Further Information:

For further information, including technical details and screenshots, see:

http://www.nta-monitor.com/news/vpn-flaws/nortel/nortel-client/

We would like to thank Nortel Networks for responding promptly to this 
issue, and producing a software fix to address it.

Roy Hills


--
Roy Hills                                    Tel:   +44 1634 721855
NTA Monitor Ltd                              FAX:   +44 1634 721844
14 Ashford House, Beaufort Court,
Medway City Estate,                          Email: Roy.Hills@...-monitor.com
Rochester, Kent ME2 4FA, UK                  WWW:   http://www.nta-monitor.com/ 



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